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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-06-08 15:20:32Z
8 months ago
Previous (2025-06-08 15:02:10Z)

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 08 JUN 25 / 15:19 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 08 JUN 25 / 15:00 ZULU - 08 JUN 25 / 15:19 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

  • AOR Update: Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (including Synelnykivskyi Raion, Mezheva community, Nikopol, Marhanets community, Pavlohrad, Kryvyi Rih, Eastern Dnipropetrovsk, Maliyivka, Dnipro, Oleksandrivskyi Raion, Orekhovo), Zaporizhzhia Oblast (including Stepnohirsk community, Vasylivskyi Raion, Prymorske village, Northern Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Melitopol, Olhivske, Zaliznychne, Novoandriyivka, Orikhiv, Malynivka, Huliaipole), Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast (including Loknya, Sumy city, Osoyivka, Myropilske, Nedryhailivska community, Esman community, Nikolskoye, Vorochina, Novonikolaevka, Russkoye Porechnoye), Russian Federation (Kursk - including Kursk region, Bryansk - including Bryansk Oblast, Moscow Oblast - including Dubna, Kstovo - Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Belgorod Oblast - including Nikolskoye, Kaluga - including Sukhinichi and Borovsk districts, Smolensk Oblasts, Moscow Region including Dubna, Podmoskovye, Moscow city, Pushkino, Vnukovo Airport, Domodedovo Airport, Zhukovsky Airport, Ramensky district, Sokolovo-Khomyanovo; Irkutsk region - Belaya airfield; Tambov Oblast - Michurinsk; Ryazan Oblast - Dyagilevo; Belgorod Oblast - Prokhorovka-Belenikhino, Zhuravlevka, Pushkarozhadinsky, Azov - Rostov Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast - Kstovo, Sevastopol, Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Tula Oblast - Novomoskovsk, Azot chemical plant; Mariupol, Kazan, Kamchatka, Sudzhansky district), Southern Donetsk Direction (including Stupochky, Bahatyr, Vesele, Burlatske, Vilne Pole, Zarya, Komar), Konstantinovka direction, Siversk direction (Verkhnokamyanske), Odesa Oblast, Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo - Alekseevka, Chasov Yar, Kramatorsk axis - including Chasiv Yar, Markove, Bila Hora, Predtechyne; Toretsk axis - including Toretsk, Dyliyivka, Yablunivka; Novopavlivka axis - including Bahatyr, Vesele, Burlatske, Vilne Pole; Krasnoarmeysk-Novosergeevka, Maryinka, Dalnee, Sokol, Lipovoe, Bakhmut, Progress, Kleshcheevka, Vasyutinskoye, south Donetsk region, Hryhorivka, Andriivka, Zarya, Poltavka, Myrolubivka, Myrne, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Lysivka, Novoserhiyivka, Udachne, Kotlyne, Novomykolayivka, Horikhove, Kotlyarivka, Bohdanivka, Novoukrayinka, Andriyivka), Kupyansk axis (Kupyansk-Vuzlovyy, Stepova Novoselivka, Kindrashivka), Kherson axis (Lvove, Kherson region), Ternopil Oblast, Kyiv, Krasnoarmeysk direction, Lviv Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast (including Varvarivka, Matviivka, Voskresenske, Konstantinivka), Poltava Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast, Vinnytsia Oblast, Cherkasy Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, Kyiv Oblast, Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), Vremivka Direction. Lyman Direction (Hrekivka, Novyy Myr, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Torske, Bilohorivka). Colombia (Bogota). Belgium. Chernihiv Oblast (Hotiyevka). Komsomolsk-on-Amur (Khabarovsk Krai, RU). Washington D.C., US. Kharkiv Oblast (including Kharkiv city). Engels (Saratov Oblast), Russia. Chelyabinsk Oblast (Argayash). Hvardiiske Airfield (Crimea). Borisoglebsk Airfield. Kursk Airfield. Ugledar. Chernivtsi Oblast. Ramensky district (Moscow Oblast). Los Angeles, USA. Gagauzia, Moldova. Kazakhstan. Gaza.

  • New Developments (UKR):

    • Air Defense (CRITICAL - Shahed Warning): ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS warns of "not less than 200 Shaheds" launched from North, East, and South directions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian milblogger, urgent warning). This directly corroborates the previous ISR's MLCOA/MDCOA.
    • Leadership Statement (Foreign Aid): РБК-Україна shares Zelenskyy's statement: "Putin can win Ukraine if there is a multi-year war and no sanctions." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian official news agency).
    • Leadership Statement (US Aid): РБК-Україна reports Zelenskyy stating: "If there is no US aid, Russians will have more chances to win." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian official news agency).
    • Strategic Messaging (NATO/EU Sanctions): STERNENKO relays Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda's statement that Merz undermined European trust by not fulfilling promises of strict sanctions against Moscow if it refused a truce. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian milblogger citing official statement). This highlights friction within European alliance.
    • ISR (Dnipropetrovsk): Повітряні Сили ЗС України reports an enemy reconnaissance UAV in Synelnykivskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, heading towards Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and that means are engaged to shoot it down. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian Air Force, real-time ISR). This is critical intelligence given previous claims of Russian penetration into Dnipropetrovsk.
    • Force Posture (Morale/Unity): Генеральний штаб ЗСУ shares photos of DSHV (Air Assault Forces) personnel with the caption: "DSHV of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have different faces. But one brotherhood. All different - and each in their place." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Official Ukrainian General Staff, morale-boosting content).
  • New Developments (RU):

    • Propaganda (US Aid/Western Savings): АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА posts "The Pentagon continues to save," implicitly criticizing US military aid to Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, anti-Western propaganda).
    • Propaganda (Human Interest - Trench Prose): Kotsnews shares "Trench prose of Adler," likely a morale-boosting or human-interest piece about Russian soldiers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, propaganda).
    • Propaganda (Disinformation/War Crimes - Kursk Oblast): Операция Z shares a video titled: "‼️🇷🇺🏴‍☠In Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye, none of the residents remaining under AFU occupation survived." The accompanying detailed text claims AFU atrocities including FPV drone attacks, killing families, restricting movement, and torture, with high civilian casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, explicit disinformation campaign alleging Ukrainian war crimes). This is a highly significant and dangerous disinformation push, given its explicit and graphic nature, and the timing suggests it's a pretext for further Russian action.
    • Training & Readiness (Tanks): MoD Russia shares a video of T-80 tank crews of the 25th Combined Arms Army (Zapad Group of Forces) improving combat skills at rear training grounds. Shows T-80BVM tanks firing, instructors, and target impacts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian MoD, propaganda promoting readiness).
    • Propaganda (Greta Thunberg): Colonelcassad shares a photo of Greta Thunberg on a sailboat with a Palestinian flag, captioned "Greta Thunberg sails to Gaza." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, likely an attempt to divert attention or align with anti-Western narratives by linking to other geopolitical issues).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

  • Previous warnings of thunderstorms in Kyiv/Kyiv Oblast and severe weather in Moscow remain relevant.
  • The widespread Shahed launch warning (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) indicates that current weather conditions across Ukraine (North, East, South) are permissive for large-scale drone operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

  • Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense):
    • Ukrainian Air Force is actively engaging enemy reconnaissance UAVs in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, indicating responsive AD posture. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • CRITICAL: Ukrainian AD forces are currently on high alert, anticipating a massive Shahed attack (200+ drones), which will test their readiness and munition reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Forces (Leadership/Strategic Communication):
    • President Zelenskyy continues to publicly address critical issues of foreign aid and sanctions, aiming to sustain international support and manage domestic expectations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Ukrainian General Staff is engaging in morale-boosting internal communication, emphasizing unity and professionalism of airborne forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Air):
    • Russian forces have initiated a massive Shahed drone attack (200+ drones) from multiple directions (North, East, South), indicating a large-scale, coordinated aerial assault intended to saturate Ukrainian AD and likely precede or accompany missile strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Russian forces are actively employing reconnaissance UAVs in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely to support or precede ground operations or strike targeting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Ground - Training/Readiness):
    • Russian MoD is showcasing T-80 tank crew training from the 25th Combined Arms Army (Zapad Group of Forces), indicating continued efforts to improve ground force readiness and promote an image of sustained combat capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Information Operations):
    • Russia has launched an extremely aggressive and graphic disinformation campaign claiming Ukrainian atrocities and war crimes in occupied Russian territory (Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye). This is a likely pretext for further escalation or to justify existing actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Russian milbloggers continue anti-Western messaging, criticizing US aid to Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Russian milbloggers are also using human-interest stories to boost internal morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Colonelcassad's post about Greta Thunberg likely serves to distract or align with broader anti-Western narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

  • Capabilities:
    • Air/Drone Warfare: Demonstrated capability to launch large-scale (200+) Shahed drone attacks from multiple vectors simultaneously. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Reconnaissance: Continues to conduct aerial reconnaissance using UAVs in forward areas, including Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely for targeting or ground force support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Ground Forces (Training): Capability to sustain and improve combat skills of armored units at rear training grounds. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Information Warfare: Highly capable in executing aggressive, graphic, and coordinated disinformation campaigns, including fabricating war crimes narratives to justify actions and discredit Ukraine. Capable of leveraging global narratives (e.g., Gaza) for distraction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Intentions:
    • Retaliation/Overwhelm AD: Primary intention is to conduct a large-scale aerial retaliation (Shahed swarm) following Ukrainian deep strikes, aiming to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and inflict widespread damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Strategic Pretext/Justification: Intends to use fabricated war crime narratives (Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye) as a pretext for further escalation, including potentially more indiscriminate strikes or ground offensives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Support Ground Operations: Use reconnaissance UAVs to support potential ground advances or targeted strikes in areas like Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Maintain Readiness/Morale: Continue training and propaganda efforts to sustain ground force readiness and domestic morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Undermine Western Support: Continue information campaigns to undermine confidence in Western aid and alliances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Courses of Action (COA):
    • MLCOA 1: Immediate Execution of Massive Saturation Drone Attack (200+ Shaheds) and Follow-On Missile Strikes, Coupled with Escalated Disinformation Campaign of Fabricated Ukrainian War Crimes (Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye) to Justify Actions, While Sustaining Reconnaissance and Ground Force Training in Support of Ongoing or Anticipated Offensives: Russia is currently executing a large-scale (200+) Shahed drone attack from multiple directions. This will be followed by and/or accompanied by missile strikes targeting Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure, especially given previous intelligence on the Azot plant strike, Iskander losses, and the Tu-22M3 bomber. The graphic disinformation campaign from Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye (alleging Ukrainian atrocities) will be heavily amplified across all Russian media channels to justify these attacks and portray Ukraine as a barbaric adversary. Reconnaissance UAVs will continue to operate in high-priority areas like Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely assessing damage or scouting for ground operations. Russian ground forces will continue training exercises in rear areas to maintain readiness for future deployments, while frontline units will likely continue attritional assaults on existing axes.
      • Confidence: HIGH (The immediate warning of 200+ Shaheds from ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS and the graphic disinformation campaign from Операция Z directly support this.)
      • Indicators: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS warning of 200+ Shaheds. Операция Z video and text on alleged Ukrainian atrocities in Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye. Повітряні Сили ЗС України reporting on reconnaissance UAV in Dnipropetrovsk. MoD Russia video on T-80 tank training. АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА and Kotsnews posts on US aid and "trench prose." Colonelcassad's Greta Thunberg post.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

  • Aerial Attack (RU): Russian forces have adapted to launch an exceptionally large number of Shahed drones (200+) in a single wave, potentially aiming for AD saturation. They are also utilizing multiple launch vectors (North, East, South). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Operations (RU): Russia has significantly escalated its disinformation tactics, moving beyond general narratives to explicit, graphic claims of Ukrainian war crimes against Russian civilians, likely to serve as a major pretext for expanded kinetic operations. This is a dangerous and highly effective adaptation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Force Generation (RU): Continued emphasis on showcasing training for armored units indicates a sustained focus on force generation and rotation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • ISR (UKR): Ukrainian Air Force's prompt detection and engagement of reconnaissance UAVs indicates effective and responsive ISR capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Strategic Communication (UKR): President Zelenskyy continues to adapt his messaging to address immediate concerns about foreign aid and its direct link to Ukraine's ability to resist. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

  • Munitions (RU): The launch of 200+ Shaheds indicates Russia has a significant reserve of these drones, either from domestic production or foreign supply. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Personnel (RU): Continued training efforts for tank crews suggest ongoing personnel replenishment and skill development. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Aid (UKR): President Zelenskyy's statements continue to highlight the critical importance of sustained US and international military aid for Ukraine's long-term ability to resist. The Lithuanian President's comments imply perceived failings in some European sanction efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

  • Russian C2: Appears highly effective in coordinating a large-scale, multi-vector Shahed attack. Also demonstrating effective coordination in launching a major, graphic disinformation campaign across various channels. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian C2: Ukrainian Air Force shows effective C2 in detecting and responding to reconnaissance UAVs. President Zelenskyy's continued strategic communication indicates a proactive and adaptable leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

  • Air Defense: Currently on extremely high alert due to the immediate threat of 200+ Shahed drones. Their ability to neutralize this large number will be a critical test of readiness and munition reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Forces (Overall): Ukrainian General Staff's photo campaign aims to boost morale and reinforce unity within the DSHV, indicating an awareness of the need to maintain cohesive fighting units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Strategic Resilience: President Zelenskyy's direct statements regarding the necessity of US aid and the long-term nature of the conflict highlight Ukraine's continued strategic resolve despite significant challenges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • Air Defense (ISR): Prompt detection and engagement of a Russian reconnaissance UAV in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Strategic Communication (Leadership): President Zelenskyy's continued proactive engagement on critical issues of aid and sanctions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Setbacks:
    • Air Defense (Threat): The imminent large-scale Shahed attack poses a significant immediate challenge, potentially overwhelming air defenses if not adequately prepared. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Information Warfare (RU): The launch of a graphic, fabricated war crime narrative (Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye) presents a major information warfare challenge for Ukraine, requiring rapid and robust counter-messaging. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Diplomatic (EU Unity): Lithuanian President's comment about Merz suggests ongoing challenges in maintaining a unified and decisive European stance on sanctions against Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

  • Air Defense Munitions (CRITICAL): The warning of 200+ Shaheds underscores the paramount and immediate need for sufficient air defense munitions, especially given the previously identified diversion of 20,000 anti-Shahed missiles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • ISR (Dnipropetrovsk): Continued and intensified ISR resources are critically required in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to monitor for further Russian UAV activity (reconnaissance or strike) and to verify/refute previous claims of ground penetration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Counter-Information Warfare: Immediate and substantial resources are needed to counter the new, highly aggressive Russian disinformation campaign alleging Ukrainian war crimes in Kursk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • International Diplomatic Engagement: Continued diplomatic efforts are required to address concerns about aid consistency and sanctions effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

  • Russian Propaganda (Internal & External - NEW FOCUS):
    • Major War Crime Fabrication: Операция Z is spearheading a highly aggressive and graphic disinformation campaign, claiming Ukrainian forces committed atrocities and massacres against civilians in Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye. This is clearly intended to serve as a major justification for escalated Russian military action and to demonize Ukrainian forces on an international stage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Undermining Western Aid: АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА continues to use anti-Western narratives, portraying the Pentagon as "saving" money, implying insufficient or grudging aid to Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Morale Boosting (Internal): Kotsnews is promoting "trench prose," likely to humanize Russian soldiers and boost morale internally. MoD Russia's video on tank crew training also serves this purpose. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Distraction/Global Alignment: Colonelcassad's post about Greta Thunberg sailing to Gaza, while seemingly unrelated, could serve to link current events to broader anti-Western sentiments or to deflect attention from direct battlefield realities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Counter-Propaganda/Information Operations:
    • Proactive Threat Warning: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS issuing an immediate warning of 200+ Shaheds demonstrates transparency and prepares the public for incoming threats, potentially mitigating panic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Advocacy for Aid: President Zelenskyy's clear statements on the criticality of US aid and sanctions are direct messages to international partners and the domestic audience, emphasizing the need for continued support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Showcasing Unity/Morale: Генеральний штаб ЗСУ is actively using imagery to promote unity and professionalism within the Armed Forces, particularly the DSHV. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Highlighting Alliance Weaknesses: STERNENKO's relay of the Lithuanian President's criticism of Germany highlights perceived divisions or weaknesses in the European response, which can be leveraged to press for stronger action. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

  • Negative Impact (UKR):
    • Imminent Mass Attack: The warning of 200+ Shaheds will cause significant public anxiety and fear, testing civilian resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Aid Concerns: President Zelenskyy's statements about the potential for Russian victory without sufficient US aid could lead to increased public concern and uncertainty regarding long-term prospects. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Positive Impact (UKR):
    • Transparency: The prompt warning of drone attacks, while alarming, demonstrates transparency from Ukrainian sources, which can build public trust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Military Unity: The General Staff's messaging on DSHV unity aims to foster pride and cohesion within the armed forces and among the public. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Positive Impact (RU):
    • Justification for Actions: The graphic claims of Ukrainian atrocities in Kursk Oblast will be used to galvanize domestic support for continued military action and reinforce anti-Ukrainian sentiment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Military Strength Projection: MoD Russia's training videos project an image of a professional and capable military, aimed at bolstering domestic morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

  • Challenges to Sanctions/Aid: Lithuanian President Nausėda's statement highlights ongoing challenges and internal disagreements within European alliances regarding the effectiveness and implementation of sanctions against Russia, potentially impacting future coordinated efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Advocacy: President Zelenskyy's direct appeals for continued US aid are crucial for sustaining international military and financial support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian IO Targeting: Russia's new, graphic "war crime" allegations in Kursk Oblast are designed to damage Ukraine's international reputation and undermine support from Western partners. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • US Aid/Spending Narrative: Russian narratives criticizing Pentagon "savings" or US aid to Ukraine are aimed at influencing public opinion in Western countries and discouraging further assistance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

  • MLCOA 1: Immediate Execution of Massive Saturation Drone Attack (200+ Shaheds) and Follow-On Missile Strikes, Coupled with Escalated Disinformation Campaign of Fabricated Ukrainian War Crimes (Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye) to Justify Actions, While Sustaining Reconnaissance and Ground Force Training in Support of Ongoing or Anticipated Offensives: Russia is currently executing a large-scale (200+) Shahed drone attack from multiple directions. This will be followed by and/or accompanied by missile strikes targeting Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure, especially given previous intelligence on the Azot plant strike, Iskander losses, and the Tu-22M3 bomber. The graphic disinformation campaign from Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye (alleging Ukrainian atrocities) will be heavily amplified across all Russian media channels to justify these attacks and portray Ukraine as a barbaric adversary. Reconnaissance UAVs will continue to operate in high-priority areas like Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely assessing damage or scouting for ground operations. Russian ground forces will continue training exercises in rear areas to maintain readiness for future deployments, while frontline units will likely continue attritional assaults on existing axes.
    • Confidence: HIGH (The immediate warning of 200+ Shaheds from ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS and the graphic disinformation campaign from Операция Z directly support this.)
    • Indicators: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS warning of 200+ Shaheds. Операция Z video and text on alleged Ukrainian atrocities in Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye. Повітряні Сили ЗС України reporting on reconnaissance UAV in Synelnykivskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk. MoD Russia video on T-80 tank training. АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА and Kotsnews posts on US aid and "trench prose." Colonelcassad's Greta Thunberg post. РБК-Україна reports on Zelenskyy's statements regarding foreign aid. STERNENKO reports Lithuanian President's criticism of Merz/sanctions.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  • MDCOA 1: Renewed Large-Scale Ballistic/Cruise Missile Campaign to Cripple Ukrainian AD and Energy/Logistics Infrastructure, with Increased Focus on Chemical/Industrial Targets, and Pre-strike AD Suppression, accompanied by Escalating Missile Rhetoric leading to Actual Missile Deployments, with new emphasis on Russian cross-border claims of "terrorism" and calls for tribunals, and direct diplomatic threats regarding strategic missile deployments: Russia, leveraging the current large-scale Shahed attack as a softening-up phase, will launch a renewed, multi-wave missile and drone campaign targeting Ukraine's critical national infrastructure, with a specific emphasis on overwhelming weakened Ukrainian air defenses and inflicting widespread damage as a "revenge strike" for the Tu-22M3 and other strategic losses. The highly graphic and fabricated war crimes narrative from Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye will be used as a primary justification for an exceptionally brutal and widespread retaliatory campaign, potentially including deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure or sites with chemical hazards (e.g., Azot plant). Prior to or concurrent with these strikes, Russia may conduct widespread air defense suppression operations to improve the effectiveness of their missile and drone attacks. The explicit threat from Russian MFA on missile deployments and the end of the moratorium could signal preparations for a new phase of strategic missile testing or even deployment in response to perceived Western threats. The diversion of 20,000 anti-Shahed missiles from Ukraine to the Middle East creates a significant window of vulnerability that Russia could exploit for this MDCOA.
    • Confidence: HIGH (The immediate warning of 200+ Shaheds and the graphic nature of the new war crimes allegations from Russia significantly increase the likelihood and danger of this MDCOA.)
    • Indicators: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS warning of 200+ Shaheds. Операция Z video and text on alleged Ukrainian atrocities in Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye. Повітряні Сили ЗС України reporting on reconnaissance UAV in Dnipropetrovsk. All previous indicators related to large-scale missile/drone strikes and justifications remain relevant.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

  • Next 24-48 Hours (Short-Term):
    • Immediate Ground Offensive in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Reinforced): The reporting of a Russian reconnaissance UAV in Synelnykivskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Повітряні Сили ЗС України), heading towards Zaporizhzhia Oblast, lends further credence to the previously assessed Russian intent for ground operations or targeted strikes in this area, following earlier claims of 90th Tank Division presence. Ukrainian forces should prepare for immediate, intense ground engagements, including drone support, in this region.
    • Sustained Retaliation/Attacks (CRITICAL - Confirmed Swarm): A major "revenge strike" by Russia is confirmed to be underway or imminent, with ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS warning of "not less than 200 Shaheds" launched from North, East, and South. This large-scale UAV swarm will likely be followed by or coincide with missile strikes targeting Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure. The new, highly aggressive Russian disinformation campaign (Операция Z) alleging Ukrainian war crimes in Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye will be used to justify these attacks. Expect continued, possibly intensified, KAB and missile/UAV attacks across Ukraine.
    • Decision Point (UKR):
      • IMMEDIATE: Prioritize air defense assets to counter the incoming mass Shahed attack. Deploy all available SHORAD, EW, and mobile fire groups to counter the multi-vector swarm. Prioritize protection of C2, critical infrastructure, and major urban centers.
      • IMMEDIATE: Prioritize ISR (IMINT, SIGINT) in Synelnykivskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and its surroundings to track the reconnaissance UAV and assess any preceding or concurrent ground movements or force buildup, especially given the previous claims of the 90th Tank Division entering the region.
      • IMMEDIATE: Launch a robust, rapid, and comprehensive counter-information campaign exposing the fabricated nature of Russia's "war crime" allegations in Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye. Use factual evidence to refute the claims, highlight the graphic and manipulative nature of the propaganda, and contrast it with Russia's own confirmed war crimes (e.g., targeting their own POWs).
      • IMMEDIATE: Reiterate and amplify President Zelenskyy's message on the critical importance of US aid and the long-term nature of the war to international partners and the domestic audience. Address concerns about European sanctions effectiveness raised by the Lithuanian President.
      • IMMEDIATE: Continue to publicize Ukrainian military successes and unity (e.g., DSHV photos) to maintain domestic morale and counter Russian demoralization efforts.
      • Intelligence Gap: Real-time BDA on the 200+ Shahed attack (interception rates, impact locations, damage assessment). Specific targets and flight paths of the reconnaissance UAV in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Full BDA of the "Azot" chemical plant strike. Detailed intelligence on the specific units and their objectives within the 90th Tank Division involved in the claimed Dnipropetrovsk penetration. Verification of the Kursk's Russkoye Porechnoye war crime claims.
      • Collection Requirement: Real-time AD reporting, UAV flight path tracking, and radar data analysis. IMINT/SIGINT on Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for UAV activity and ground force movements. Post-strike BDA on Azot plant. HUMINT/OSINT in Kursk Oblast (if feasible) to verify Russian war crime claims. Comprehensive monitoring of Russian state media and milblogger channels for the amplification of the Kursk narrative.

END REPORT

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