Situation Report

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 07 JUN 25 / 05:42 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 07 JUN 25 / 05:12 ZULU - 07 JUN 25 / 05:42 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• AOR: Kharkiv Oblast (Kharkiv city - Kyivskyi and Osnovyanskyi Districts, suburbs; Vovchansk/Tykhe), Volyn Oblast (Lutsk), Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Dnipro, oblast border, Kryvyi Rih), Zaporizhzhia Oblast (14 populated areas), Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast (Sumy direction), Russian Federation (Kursk, Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk Oblasts, Moscow Region including Dubna, Podmoskovye; Saratov Oblast - Engels; Tambov Oblast - Michurinsk; Ryazan Oblast - Dyagilevo; Belgorod Oblast - Prokhorovka-Belenikhino; Kryvyi Rih).
• Key Terrain (Kharkiv City): Civilian fatalities remain at 3, injured at 17 from the ongoing combined aerial attack. Damage to 18 multi-apartment buildings (3 with structural damage) and 13 private homes. A separate fire caused by 8 Shahed drones on the outskirts. Air raid sirens activated for Kharkiv Oblast due to threat of hostile UAVs. New: Video evidence of continued destruction to residential buildings in Kharkiv confirms ongoing targeting of civilian infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Key Terrain (Kharkiv Oblast - Vovchansk/Tykhe): Russian sources continue to claim firm consolidation of new positions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Russian claim)
• Key Terrain (Lutsk, Volyn Oblast): Civilian fatality count from previous night's attack remains at two. Search and rescue operations concluded. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Key Terrain (Zaporizhzhia Oblast): Russian forces launched 574 strikes on 14 populated areas within the last 24 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Key Terrain (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): Overnight, Ukrainian air defense forces intercepted 6 missiles and 27 UAVs. The situation in Kryvyi Rih is reported as "controlled." Imagery corroborates widespread window damage in residential buildings, consistent with blast effects, further confirming civilian infrastructure targeting. New: Russian sources ("НгП раZVедка") claim successful combined attack with 40 UAVs and Iskander-M OTRK on "Dnipropress" factory in Dnipropetrovsk (Dnipro), citing large fires. ASTRA channel posts imagery of damaged residential buildings in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and reports casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian claim, HIGH - Imagery)
• Key Terrain (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Border): Russian FPV drone teams ("Vanya Ivanov group") continue "clearing" operations. Russian milblogger "Rybar" presents simulated map indicating a step-by-step progression towards Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border from Vremivka direction, supporting the notion of continued Russian pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Key Terrain (Sumy Direction): Russian SpN "Akhmat" groups deploying heavy bomber drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) New: Russian military expert Marochko (via TASS) claims Russian forces have taken control of a road section near Yunakivka, depriving AFU of the ability to regain lost positions. This is in Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Russian claim)
• Key Terrain (Black and Azov Seas): Ukrainian Navy reports no Russian Kalibr missile carriers present. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Key Terrain (Russian Internal): Russian MoD claims interception of 36 Ukrainian UAVs over Kursk, Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk Oblasts, and the Moscow region. Bryansk Oblast Governor reports 15 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Bryansk Oblast. A Russian video shows a 14th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (Spetsnaz) "Vostok" UAV operator targeting Ukrainian drones on the Shakhtarsky direction. New: "Операция Z" (milblogger) reports MoD confirmation of enemy attempting to break through to Moscow. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian claims)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Weather: No specific weather updates. Continued aerial attacks and drone operations indicate suitable conditions for air and drone warfare.
• Environmental Factors: Confirmed fires and rubble in Kharkiv continue to present significant challenges for emergency services. The widespread damage and strikes across Zaporizhzhia Oblast will strain local environmental conditions and infrastructure. Imagery from Dnipropetrovsk showing widespread window damage confirms blast effects in urban areas, leading to debris and potential environmental hazards. New: Russian claims of large fires at "DniproPress" factory in Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk) suggest significant localized environmental impact from smoke and potential hazardous materials, requiring regional firefighting efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense): Under extreme pressure in Kharkiv due to combined saturation attacks (48 Shaheds, 4 KABs, 2 rockets). Successful interceptions of 6 missiles and 27 UAVs persist in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The absence of Kalibr carriers offers temporary reprieve on the southern axis. Air Force of Ukraine issues alerts for tactical aviation activity in the south and renewed UAV threat in Kharkiv Oblast, indicating ongoing AD posture and responsiveness. New: Ukrainian General Staff reports 4 MLRS (13 rockets) and 7 aerial strikes (15 KABs) in the Kursk direction (likely targeting Ukrainian positions near border). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) "ASTRA" channel confirms casualties in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from combined drone/missile attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Forces (Emergency Services): DSNS in Kharkiv remains critically engaged in search and rescue, fire suppression, and casualty management, now with increased fatality and injury counts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) DSNS in Lutsk has concluded SAR operations. New: Ukrainian emergency services will likely be heavily engaged in Dnipropetrovsk (Dnipro) due to reported strikes on "DniproPress" factory and civilian casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Forces (Navy): Conducting real-time monitoring of Russian naval assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Forces (Ground - Kharkiv): Engaged in defensive operations against Russian consolidation efforts near Vovchansk and Tykhe. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Forces (Ground - Sumy Direction): Facing Russian claims of control over road sections near Yunakivka. Requires verification of Ukrainian defensive posture and potential loss of positions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Ukrainian Forces (General Staff): Continue to report aggregated enemy losses (with an erroneous July 2025 date for some reports, likely a typo) and provide general operational updates on various axes. New: General Staff provides morning update, details of which need to be fully assimilated (e.g., Kursk direction activity, specific number of combat engagements, artillery/UAV strikes). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Forces (Air): Confirmed multi-modal (drones, guided bombs, rockets/missiles) strike capability against Kharkiv (48 Shaheds, 4 KABs, 2 rockets/missiles). Threat of renewed UAV strikes on Kharkiv Oblast. Russian MoD claims successful interception of Ukrainian UAVs over various Russian regions, now specifically 15 UAVs over Bryansk Oblast from local reports. Air Force of Ukraine reports tactical aviation activity in the southern direction, indicating potential for new air-launched munitions. New: Russian sources claim 40 UAVs and Iskander-M OTRK used in attack on Dnipropetrovsk. MoD also claims continued attempts by enemy to break through to Moscow with UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian claims)
• Russian Forces (Ground - Kharkiv): Pro-Russian sources claim firm consolidation of positions near Vovchansk and Tykhe. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Russian Forces (Ground - Dnipropetrovsk Border): FPV drone teams actively conducting operations near the border. Russian milblogger "Rybar" narrative strongly suggests continued ground pressure towards Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Forces (Ground - Sumy Direction): SpN "Akhmat" groups deploying heavy bomber drones. New: Russian military expert Marochko claims control of a road section near Yunakivka. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Russian Forces (Logistics): Colonelcassad (milblogger) posts video showing Russian fuel services (TSH) operating 24/7 in Kherson Oblast, suggesting sustained logistical efforts to support frontline units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Control Measures: Air Raid Sirens (ARS) remain active in Kharkiv Oblast. Emergency services heavily engaged. Yellow alert lifted in Lipetsk, Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Capabilities:
  • Aerial (Multi-Modal Saturation): Russia continues to demonstrate advanced capability for massed, multi-modal strikes (drones, guided bombs, rockets/missiles) against urban centers like Kharkiv (48 Shaheds, 4 KABs, 2 rockets/missiles) and now Dnipropetrovsk (claimed 40 UAVs and Iskander-M). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • UAV (Recon/Strike/Heavy Bomber): Sustained use of UAVs for reconnaissance and targeting is evident, both offensively against Ukraine and defensively within Russia (claimed interceptions of 36 Ukrainian UAVs, 15 specifically over Bryansk). Russian forces (SpN "Akhmat") are also deploying heavy bomber drones on the Sumy direction. Russian units like 14th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (Spetsnaz) "Vostok" demonstrate counter-UAV capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ballistic Missiles: Confirmed use of Iskander-M OTRK in Dnipropetrovsk attack (Russian claim). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Naval (Kalibr): Current absence of Kalibr carriers is noted, but their capability to deploy these assets rapidly from secure bases remains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground (Defensive/Offensive Consolidation/Local Offensive): Russian forces in Kharkiv Oblast (Vovchansk/Tykhe) are consolidating positions and likely preparing for further defensive or limited offensive actions. Active "clearing" operations near the Dnipropetrovsk border indicate localized ground offensives. "Rybar" map supports continued ground pressure on the Vremivka-Dnipropetrovsk axis. New Russian claim of controlling road section near Yunakivka (Sumy Oblast) indicates capability for tactical advances to secure logistical routes or cut off Ukrainian positions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Tactical Aviation: Presence of tactical aviation in the southern direction indicates capability for continued air-launched attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Logistics: Demonstrated ability to sustain fuel supplies to frontline units in Kherson Oblast (Colonelcassad video). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk/Other Urban Centers: To cause maximum civilian casualties, terrorize the population, overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and emergency services, and degrade civilian infrastructure through sheer volume and diversity of attack. The increasing number of civilian fatalities and injured, and the damage to residential buildings, unequivocally supports this. This is a clear, deliberate act of psychological warfare and retaliation. Specific targeting of "DniproPress" factory suggests an intent to degrade Ukraine's industrial capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Vovchansk/Tykhe: To hold recently gained positions and prevent Ukrainian counterattacks, solidifying a tactical advantage in the northern Kharkiv axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Dnipropetrovsk Border: To probe and apply pressure on the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, potentially securing further tactical advances and disrupting Ukrainian defensive lines, as supported by "Rybar" channel's focus on this axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: To maintain sustained pressure on civilian areas through overwhelming local fires, likely aiming to degrade morale and infrastructure support for the frontlines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Sumy Direction: To increase offensive pressure by leveraging heavy drone bomber capabilities and tactical ground advances (e.g., Yunakivka road section) for tactical advantage and softening Ukrainian defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Overall: To continue to deplete Ukrainian air defense munitions through saturation attacks, while pressing ground offensives where tactical opportunities arise, using a multi-domain approach that integrates ground forces with various drone capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Courses of Action (COA):
  • COA 1 (MLCOA - Continued Sustained and Diversified Saturation Attacks on Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Other Urban Centers): Russia will continue sustained, high-intensity drone, guided bomb, and missile/rocket attacks on Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and other key urban centers to deplete air defense munitions and inflict maximum civilian damage. Renewed UAV threat for Kharkiv indicates this is already in progress. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • COA 2 (Consolidation and Local Offensive in Kharkiv (Northern Axis), Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Donetsk): Russia will continue to consolidate positions around Vovchansk and Tykhe, and continue ground assaults along key axes, particularly the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border with FPV drone support, and the Sumy direction using enhanced drone capabilities and limited tactical advances (Yunakivka), while maintaining pressure on the Donetsk direction (Fedorivka area). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • COA 3 (Temporary Reduction in Sea-Launched Missile Strikes with Potential Air-Launched Strikes): Due to the current absence of Kalibr carriers, a temporary reduction in sea-launched missile strikes is likely in the immediate future, potentially to rearm or reposition. However, threat from air-launched missiles (e.g., from tactical aviation in the south) remains high. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • COA 4 (Information Warfare Amplification): Russia will continue to leverage historical narratives, internal political disputes in Western nations (e.g., Trump's statements on Ukraine's deep strikes), and claims of successful interdiction of Ukrainian UAVs (e.g., Moscow region) to sow discord and undermine support for Ukraine, while denying civilian targeting and fabricating narratives (e.g., body exchange). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Intensified Diversified Saturation in Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk: The specific breakdown of 48 Shaheds, 4 KABs, and 2 rockets/missiles for the Kharkiv attack, and claimed 40 UAVs and Iskander-M for Dnipropetrovsk, demonstrates a highly sophisticated and complex saturation strategy, aiming to maximize impact and overwhelm air defenses. This is a deliberate tactical adaptation to complicate Ukrainian air defense.
• Emphasis on Ground Consolidation and Localized Offensives: Russian milblogger reports emphasize firm consolidation of positions near Vovchansk and Tykhe, and FPV drone teams actively engaging near the Dnipropetrovsk border, indicating an operational shift from pure offensive to securing gains and limited, targeted advances. The "Rybar" channel's focus on the Vremivka-Dnipropetrovsk axis further supports this. The claim of securing a road near Yunakivka further suggests tactical, localized advances aimed at improving Russian operational control.
• Deployment of Heavy Bomber Drones: The use of "heavy bomber drones" by SpN "Akhmat" in the Sumy direction represents a tactical adaptation to provide enhanced close air support or precision strikes in challenging terrain, potentially compensating for manned aircraft limitations.
• Counter-UAV Tactics by Russian Forces: Russian units are demonstrating active counter-UAV measures, as seen in the "Vostok" video and confirmed by recent Bryansk Oblast reports, suggesting an adaptation to defend against Ukrainian drone operations.
• Aggressive Information Warfare (Exploiting Internal Conflicts & Justifying Attacks): The rapid leveraging of internal US political disputes (Trump's justification for Russian attacks) by Russian sources for propaganda purposes demonstrates a highly adaptive and opportunistic information warfare strategy. The specific Russian claims about "DniproPress" factory damage and "successful negotiations" (sarcastic term for strikes) highlight their use of information space to boast about and justify attacks.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• The continued high volume and diversity of aerial attacks on Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk suggests Russia's ongoing capability to produce or acquire these assets in significant numbers, indicating a sustained supply chain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• The overwhelming number of strikes (574 in 24 hours) on Zaporizhzhia Oblast indicates substantial local ammunition and personnel sustainment capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• The temporary absence of Kalibr carriers may indicate a logistical reset or rearming phase for naval assets. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Russian MoD claims of intercepting 36 Ukrainian UAVs (including 15 over Bryansk) indicate a sustained effort and resource allocation to internal air defense, potentially drawing resources from the front lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Colonelcassad's video confirming 24/7 fuel support in Kherson Oblast demonstrates Russia's continued focus on frontline logistics, suggesting a robust sustainment effort for ground forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian concerns regarding Starlink disruption due to US internal politics suggest potential vulnerabilities in their own information network, or an attempt to probe Ukrainian reliance on Starlink. (CONFIDENCE: LOW - no direct impact yet, but potential for disruption)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2 demonstrates highly effective coordination for high-volume, multi-modal aerial saturation attacks on Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Effective integration of various drone types (reconnaissance, FPV, heavy bomber, and defensive counter-UAV) with ground forces (SpN "Akhmat", "Vanya Ivanov group", "Vostok" Spetsnaz) indicates competent tactical and operational C2, particularly in border areas and the Shakhtarsky direction. The "Rybar" map showcasing coordinated ground advances further reinforces this. The reported tactical advance near Yunakivka also suggests effective local C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Effective integration of air and ground assets in support of strategic objectives (e.g., terrorizing civilians, degrading industrial capacity, depleting air defenses) indicates competent strategic-level C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Rapid dissemination of propaganda leveraging current events (e.g., Trump's comments, "DniproPress" claims) indicates an agile and centrally controlled information warfare apparatus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense: Ukrainian air defense forces are engaged in active combat operations under severe pressure in Kharkiv, successfully intercepting a high percentage of incoming threats but still experiencing significant penetrations. The multi-vector saturation attacks will continue to stress air defense resources and munition stockpiles. Successful interception of 6 missiles and 27 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast demonstrates continued readiness. Renewed UAV threat on Kharkiv highlights the persistent AD challenge. New reports of damage and casualties in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from combined drone/missile attack indicate AD was overwhelmed in some areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Emergency Services: DSNS in Kharkiv is operating under immense strain, dealing with multiple fires, search and rescue operations, and a rapidly rising number of casualties. Their continued dedication and capability under duress are evident, highlighted by rescue operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) DSNS in Lutsk has concluded SAR operations. New: DSNS and medical personnel in Dnipropetrovsk (Dnipro) will be under significant pressure responding to the claimed attacks on "DniproPress" factory and civilian casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Navy: Maintaining effective situational awareness and reporting on adversary naval deployments in the Black and Azov Seas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Forces (Kharkiv/Northern Axis): Engaged in defensive operations against Russian consolidation efforts near Vovchansk and Tykhe. Maintaining strong defensive positions remains critical. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Forces (Zaporizhzhia Oblast): Under constant pressure from overwhelming localized fire and drone attacks. Maintaining defensive integrity and protecting civilian populations in 14 affected areas is critical. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Forces (Dnipropetrovsk Border): Facing direct pressure and "clearing" operations by Russian FPV drone teams. Maintaining robust defensive positions and counter-drone capabilities is paramount. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Forces (Sumy Direction): Facing increased pressure from Russian SpN "Akhmat" heavy bomber drones and claims of Russian tactical advances (Yunakivka). Readiness to counter these new drone types and associated ground forces is essential. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Forces (General Staff): Continues to compile and disseminate daily enemy loss figures, which serve as an important morale and information tool. Morning update provides ongoing situational awareness, including activity in the Kursk direction (likely targeting Ukrainian border positions). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Fundraising Efforts: STERNEKO's message indicates a continued need for funding for infantry operations (e.g., "rusorez" - potentially referring to equipment for engaging Russian infantry during assaults), suggesting ongoing heavy ground engagements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Successful deblocking of a female survivor from rubble in Kharkiv, highlighting the resilience and effectiveness of emergency services. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Successful interception of 6 missiles and 27 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ukrainian Navy's timely and accurate reporting of the absence of Kalibr carriers in the Black and Azov Seas indicates effective ISR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Search and rescue operations concluded in Lutsk, demonstrating rapid response. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Continued deep strikes on Russian territory (Podmoskovye, Kursk, Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk Oblasts) by Ukrainian UAVs, confirmed by Russian reports. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kryvyi Rih situation reported as "controlled," indicating effective local defense measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Reported destruction of +1 Helicopter in the daily losses by General Staff. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - based on friendly reporting)
• Setbacks:
  • Three confirmed civilian fatalities and 17 injured (including children) in Kharkiv due to the ongoing saturation attack. Damage to 18 multi-apartment buildings and 13 private homes. This represents a severe setback for civilian protection and morale, and a critical humanitarian crisis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Confirmed second civilian fatality in Lutsk from previous night's attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Russian claims of firm consolidation near Vovchansk and Tykhe (if confirmed by other sources) represent a tactical setback for Ukrainian forces in the northern Kharkiv axis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • The overwhelming number and diversity of impacts indicate that a significant number of aerial threats are penetrating, causing extensive damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Sustained, high volume (574 strikes) of Russian attacks on Zaporizhzhia Oblast, indicating significant pressure and damage to civilian areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Confirmed Russian FPV drone "clearing" operations near the Dnipropetrovsk border, indicating an ongoing threat and potential for further Russian advances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • The ongoing threat of new UAV strikes on Kharkiv Oblast represents a continued strain on AD resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New: Russian claims of successful combined attack on "DniproPress" factory in Dnipropetrovsk (Dnipro) with 40 UAVs and Iskander-M OTRK, and ASTRA's imagery of damaged residential buildings and casualties, indicate significant damage and civilian impact in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, representing a major setback in civilian protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New: Russian claim of controlling a road section near Yunakivka (Sumy Oblast) (if confirmed) represents a tactical setback and potential loss of ground for AFU in that area. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense Munitions: The current intensity and multi-vector nature of Russian aerial attacks on Kharkiv (48 Shaheds, 4 KABs, 2 rockets) and Dnipropetrovsk (6 missiles, 27 UAVs intercepted; claimed 40 UAVs, Iskander-M impacted) will rapidly deplete air defense interceptor munitions for all types of threats, including guided bombs and ballistic missiles. This remains an immediate and critical constraint. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Emergency Response Resources: DSNS, medical, and rescue teams in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and now Dnipropetrovsk (Dnipro) require significant additional resources (equipment, personnel, medical supplies) to manage the growing crisis from sustained and massed attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Combat Engineering/Fortification Materials: Given Russian claims of consolidating positions near Vovchansk/Tykhe and continued pressure near Dnipropetrovsk/Sumy, there will be an ongoing need for materials to construct and reinforce defensive lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Medical Supplies/Trauma Care: The rising number of civilian casualties in Kharkiv, Lutsk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast underscores the critical need for immediate and ongoing medical and trauma support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Drone Capabilities: Increased deployment of various Russian drones, including heavy bomber drones, necessitates an urgent need for advanced EW systems and anti-drone capabilities to protect frontline forces and critical infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Information Dissemination: Ensure accurate and timely public reporting, and correct erroneous dates in official reports (e.g., General Staff loss figures). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Funding for Ground Forces: STERNEKO's call for more funding for "rusorez" (likely related to infantry equipment/operations) suggests a financial requirement to support ground forces in ongoing assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Propaganda:
  • Russian MoD is actively reporting high numbers of intercepted Ukrainian UAVs over Russian territory (e.g., 36 drones, now specifically 15 over Bryansk Oblast), designed to project effectiveness of their air defenses and counter Ukrainian deep strike narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Russian milbloggers ("Операция Z", "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺", "Воин DV", "Rybar", "НгП раZVедка") continue to disseminate videos and claims of tactical successes, including FPV drone operations near the Dnipropetrovsk border, "Akhmat" SpN heavy bomber drone capabilities on the Sumy direction, counter-UAV engagements on the Shakhtarsky direction, and now claims of successful strikes on "DniproPress" factory in Dnipropetrovsk/Dnipro (using 40 UAVs and Iskander-M) with satirical, cynical language regarding "negotiations with Nazis" and widespread fires. The "Rybar" channel's simulated map serves to reinforce claims of ground advances towards Dnipropetrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • TASS and other official sources continue to frame international criticism as "distorting history" (e.g., Volodin on German Chancellor Merz's D-Day comments) and project internal control (e.g., "yellow level" lifted, cybercrime arrests in St. Petersburg, resumed air travel dialogue with US). New: Russian military expert Marochko (via TASS) claims capture of a road section near Yunakivka, reinforcing narrative of Russian advances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • The general narrative around Kharkiv remains "retaliation" for Ukrainian deep strikes, obscuring the indiscriminate targeting of civilians. Russian sources are leveraging US political commentary (Trump on Merz/D-Day; Trump-Musk dispute and Starlink; Trump's new statement justifying Russian attacks on Ukrainian airfields as a "pretext" for retaliation) to further sow discord in international support for Ukraine and question the reliability of key communication infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Russian military channels (e.g., Басурин о главном) are posting historical content ("#ДЕНЬвИСТОРИИ"), possibly to reinforce patriotic narratives or distract from current operational realities. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Colonelcassad's video on 24/7 fuel services in Kherson Oblast is a propaganda piece designed to show Russian logistical resilience and commitment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives: Ukrainian official channels (Kharkiv ODA Syniehubov, Mayor Terekhov, Zaporizhzhia ODA, Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office, DSNS, Dnipropetrovsk ODA Lysak, Air Force of Ukraine, General Staff, "РБК-Україна", "Оперативний ЗСУ") continue to provide real-time updates on the severity of attacks, rising civilian casualties (including children), and specific impacts on residential areas (Kyivskyi and Osnovyanskyi Districts, 18 multi-apartment, 13 private homes, and now Dnipropetrovsk with ASTRA's imagery), emphasizing the unprovoked and indiscriminate nature of Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Navy's report on Kalibr carriers serves as a transparent and factual counter to potential Russian disinformation about naval threats. Ukrainian officials are likely documenting these attacks as war crimes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The reporting on Kryvyi Rih being "controlled" provides a counter-narrative to Russian efforts to instill fear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The General Staff's daily loss figures aim to boost morale and present a narrative of successful defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) STERNEKO's direct appeal for fundraising for infantry operations ("rusorez") serves as a transparent call for support, acknowledging ongoing ground combat needs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Public (Kharkiv/Lutsk/Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk): The sustained and devastating attacks, now with confirmed fatalities and increased casualties, continue to induce profound fear and trauma. However, the successful rescue of a survivor in Kharkiv and the transparent reporting by Ukrainian officials will likely reinforce community resilience and trust in emergency services and authorities. The increasing civilian toll will also harden resolve against the aggressor. The new attacks and casualties in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast will further challenge morale, but also reinforce anti-Russian sentiment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) STERNEKO's fundraising efforts suggest a continued readiness of the Ukrainian public to contribute to the war effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Public (General): The ongoing attacks on cities and the clear targeting of civilians and children will reinforce the urgency for more robust air defense and international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Public: Russian state media continues to project an image of normalcy (e.g., Moscow news, economic reports) and military success (drone interceptions, claimed advances, successful strikes on "military-industrial" targets like "DniproPress") to maintain morale and suppress dissent. The focus on internal US political disputes aims to reinforce narratives of Western instability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• The clear evidence of ongoing deliberate targeting of civilian residential buildings, with confirmed fatalities including children, will likely intensify international condemnation of Russia and reinforce the urgency for further military aid, particularly comprehensive air defense systems capable of countering drones, missiles, and guided bombs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian attempts to discredit international figures (e.g., Merz) and leverage US political discourse (e.g., Trump's new justification for Russian attacks) suggest a heightened sensitivity to international criticism regarding their historical narratives and current actions, and an attempt to weaken international coalitions. Trump's statement, if widely adopted, could create a significant fissure in Western support, requiring careful diplomatic management. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• The continued flow of intelligence and humanitarian aid must be maintained.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• MLCOA 1 (Continued Sustained and Diversified Saturation Attacks on Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Other Urban Centers): Russia will continue sustained, high-intensity drone, guided bomb, and missile/rocket attacks on Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and other key urban centers to further deplete air defense munitions, inflict maximum civilian damage, and reinforce their "retaliation" narrative. This multi-vector approach aims to overwhelm defenses, as evidenced by current UAV threats on Kharkiv and recent strikes on Dnipropetrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• MLCOA 2 (Consolidation and Local Offensive in Kharkiv (Northern Axis), Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Donetsk): Russia will maintain ground assaults along key axes, particularly in the northern Kharkiv axis (Vovchansk/Tykhe area) to consolidate claimed positions, near the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border with FPV drone support (supported by "Rybar" channel's focus), and on the Sumy direction leveraging heavy bomber drones and tactical advances (Yunakivka road section), while maintaining pressure on the Donetsk direction (Fedorivka area). They will continue to use various UAVs to target Ukrainian artillery and logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• MLCOA 3 (Aggressive Information Operations and Denials, Leveraging External Political Statements): Russia will intensify efforts to discredit Ukraine through claims of high Ukrainian losses, false flag operations, and continued cynical mocking of civilian suffering, while also attempting to project internal governmental stability and control. They will likely deny deliberate civilian targeting and emphasize their "retaliation" narrative, leveraging international statements where politically convenient (e.g., Trump's latest comments justifying Russian attacks, historical distortion of D-Day). They will continue to boast about successful strikes on "military-industrial" targets even if civilian infrastructure is also hit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• MLCOA 4 (Naval Asset Repositioning/Reloading and Potential Air-Launched Missile Strikes): Given the current absence of Kalibr carriers, Russia will likely be engaged in repositioning or reloading these assets from secure bases, meaning they could reappear in naval operational zones within 24-48 hours. Simultaneously, the reported activity of Russian tactical aviation in the south suggests a continued threat of air-launched missiles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• MDCOA 1 (Combined Aerial/Ground Offensive on a New Axis following Air Defense Depletion): After exhausting Ukrainian air defenses through sustained multi-vector aerial attacks on Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and other key cities, Russia shifts a significant portion of its remaining aerial assets to directly support a new ground offensive on an unexpected axis (e.g., deeper into Sumy Oblast towards Sumy city, or a deeper push into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast beyond border areas), aiming to exploit weakened air defense coverage and logistics. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• MDCOA 2 (Escalated Use of Thermobaric or Chemical Munitions in Urban Areas): Russia could escalate its targeting of urban areas by deploying thermobaric weapons or, in a highly dangerous scenario, chemical munitions, particularly in areas where ground advances are stalled, aiming to break Ukrainian resistance or terrorize the population into capitulation. (CONFIDENCE: LOW - but consequences HIGH)
• MDCOA 3 (Significant Naval Missile Re-engagement Coordinated with Ground Offensive): Russian Kalibr carriers, after repositioning/reloading, return to the Black Sea and launch a massed salvo against Ukrainian critical infrastructure or command centers, potentially coordinated with air-launched attacks and a renewed ground offensive in a critical area. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Next 1-2 hours: Continued high threat of aerial attacks (Shaheds, guided bombs, potentially missiles/rockets) on Kharkiv, possibly with a focus on fire spread or secondary targets after the initial wave. Emergency response operations in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk (Dnipro) will remain critical, focusing on search and rescue and casualty management. Ukrainian officials will likely provide updated casualty figures and damage assessments. Threat of tactical aviation activity in the south.
• Next 2-6 hours: Ukrainian Air Force will likely issue updated interception statistics for the current wave of attacks. Further Russian claims of battlefield successes/Ukrainian losses and interceptions of Ukrainian UAVs (including over Bryansk and Moscow region) are highly likely. The severity of the Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk attacks may prompt urgent international statements of condemnation and pledges of support. Ground engagements, particularly near the Dnipropetrovsk border and in the Sumy direction (Yunakivka), will likely continue at high intensity.
• Next 12-24 hours: High probability of a follow-up Russian aerial attack on Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, or other major cities, given the current retaliatory cycle and the continued availability of munitions. Ukrainian air defense force posture and munition levels will be critical decision points. Ground operations around Vovchansk/Tykhe, Fedorivka, Dnipropetrovsk border, and Sumy direction will likely intensify, with Russia attempting to consolidate and expand gains. The status of Russian Kalibr carriers should be monitored closely for their potential re-engagement. The intensity of strikes on Zaporizhzhia Oblast will likely continue. The General Staff's report on overall enemy losses for 07 JUN 25 suggests continued heavy fighting.

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. Comprehensive Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for Kharkiv (Kyivskyi and Osnovyanskyi Districts) and Dnipropetrovsk (Dnipro):
   • GAP: Full scope of damage to all affected residential buildings, industrial facilities (e.g., "DniproPress" factory), and critical infrastructure. Precise and final number of killed/injured, with age breakdown for children. Identification of specific targets if any, beyond indiscriminate civilian areas. Verification of the "rocket" type used in the combined strike and the exact type of "guided aerial bombs" (e.g., KAB-1500, KAB-500) and whether Iskander-M was used in Dnipropetrovsk attack.
   • IR/CR: OSINT (local reports, official statements, social media, imagery, geo-located videos, specifically from the Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk Prosecutor's Office), HUMINT (first responders, hospital reports), GEOINT (post-strike satellite imagery), FORENSIC ANALYSIS (weapon debris analysis). (PRIORITY: CRITICAL)
2. Verification of Russian Claims on Vovchansk/Tykhe Consolidation, Dnipropetrovsk Border "Clearing", and Yunakivka Road Control:
   • GAP: Independent confirmation of the extent of Russian control and "firm consolidation" of positions near Vovchansk and Tykhe. Assessment of the tactical impact on Ukrainian forces and defensive lines in the northern Kharkiv axis. Verification of the extent of Russian advances and "clearing" operations near the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and the specific units involved (e.g., confirming "Vanya Ivanov group" affiliation). Confirm the accuracy of "Rybar" channel's simulated map's representation of ground advances. Crucially, verify the Russian claim of controlling a road section near Yunakivka in Sumy Oblast and its tactical implications for AFU.
   • IR/CR: OSINT (Ukrainian official statements, independent journalistic reports, analysis of Russian video for geo-location), IMINT (drone footage, satellite imagery of the claimed locations), SIGINT (intercepted tactical communications), HUMINT (frontline reports). (PRIORITY: HIGH)
3. Detailed Assessment of Russian Heavy Bomber Drone Capabilities and Deployment:
   • GAP: Technical specifications, payload capacity, operational range, and typical target sets of the "heavy bomber drones" reportedly used by SpN "Akhmat" in the Sumy direction. Current deployment locations and frequency of use. Identification of countermeasures being employed by Ukrainian forces.
   • IR/CR: OSINT (analysis of Russian propaganda videos for technical details, expert analysis), SIGINT (drone control frequencies, telemetry), IMINT (satellite imagery of deployment areas, post-strike assessments). (PRIORITY: HIGH)
4. Confirmation of Kalibr Carrier Status and Location:
   • GAP: While their absence from operational zones is confirmed, understanding their exact locations and intentions (rearming, repositioning, maintenance) is critical for predicting future naval missile threats.
   • IR/CR: SIGINT (naval communications, electronic emissions), IMINT (satellite imagery of naval bases), OSINT (Russian official and milblogger reporting). (PRIORITY: HIGH)
5. Assessment of Ukrainian Deep Strike Successes and Russian Counter-UAV Effectiveness:
   • GAP: Independent verification of Russian claims of 36 intercepted Ukrainian UAVs (including 15 over Bryansk and "attempts to break through to Moscow"). Comprehensive BDA for the previously reported Kronstadt UAV plant, Engels oil depot, and Progress plant strikes. Detailed analysis of Russian counter-UAV tactics observed in combat footage (e.g., 14th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade "Vostok" video).
   • IR/CR: OSINT (Russian local media, social media, imagery analysis, independent BDA from commercial satellite imagery), IMINT (post-strike satellite imagery of alleged targets), SIGINT (Russian air defense intercepts). (PRIORITY: MEDIUM)
6. Verification of General Staff Reported Enemy Losses and Date Anomaly:
   • GAP: Independent verification of the daily and cumulative enemy loss figures reported by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, specifically the +1 helicopter and significant armored vehicle losses. Clarification regarding the "July 6, 2025" date discrepancy in some reports.
   • IR/CR: OSINT (cross-referencing with other Ukrainian military/OSINT channels, independent analysts), IMINT (satellite imagery of alleged destruction sites, drone footage). (PRIORITY: MEDIUM)
7. Assessment of Russian Tactical Air Activity (Kursk Direction):
   • GAP: Confirmation of type and number of aircraft involved in "seven aerial strikes" and "15 guided aerial bombs" reported by Ukrainian General Staff in the Kursk direction. Identification of specific targets (e.g., AFU positions, border infrastructure).
   • IR/CR: OSINT (Ukrainian military reporting, local reports), SIGINT (aircraft emissions, communication intercepts), IMINT (drone footage, satellite imagery). (PRIORITY: MEDIUM)

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Immediate Prioritization and Allocation of Multi-Layered Air Defense for Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Vulnerable Cities:
   • Recommendation: Reallocate all available short-to-medium range air defense assets capable of countering drones, guided bombs, and missiles/rockets (including ballistic missiles like Iskander-M) to Kharkiv and Dnipro, with a specific focus on protecting civilian areas, industrial targets, and critical infrastructure, especially given the renewed UAV/missile threat. Implement a layered defense strategy, prioritizing detection and engagement of guided aerial bombs and ballistic missiles. Actively track Russian tactical aircraft movements capable of launching guided bombs in the southern direction and near border areas (e.g., Kursk direction). Prepare for a prolonged period of intense, multi-vector saturation attacks.
   • Action: Implement dynamic air defense sector re-tasking based on real-time threat analysis. Urgently request additional MANPADS, mobile anti-drone systems (including EW), and interceptor munitions (for all threat types, especially those effective against glide bombs and ballistic missiles) from international partners, emphasizing the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding and the new combined threat. Prioritize sustainment of current AD systems.
2. Intensify Emergency Response and Humanitarian Aid for Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia:
   • Recommendation: Fully activate and deploy all available DSNS, medical, and volunteer resources for search and rescue, fire suppression, and mass casualty management in Kharkiv (Kyivskyi and Osnovyanskyi Districts and suburbs), Dnipro (and surrounding areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), and the 14 affected populated areas of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Establish secure humanitarian shelters for displaced civilians and pre-position medical supplies. Conduct immediate structural integrity assessments of damaged buildings, as indicated by new imagery from Dnipropetrovsk.
   • Action: Expedite coordination with international humanitarian organizations for rapid deployment of personnel, specialized equipment (heavy lifting, trauma care), and medical supplies. Provide immediate psychosocial and trauma support for affected civilians and first responders. Ensure robust public warning systems are operational and actively promoted.
3. Counter Russian Information Operations Aggressively and Document War Crimes:
   • Recommendation: Launch an immediate and robust international information campaign to counter Russian propaganda celebrating civilian casualties and spreading disinformation. Highlight Russian war crimes, specifically the deliberate targeting of civilians and children with multiple weapon types, unequivocally. Publicly refute Russian claims of firm consolidation near Vovchansk/Tykhe and control of Yunakivka road if contradictory evidence exists, and expose the nature of "clearing" operations near the Dnipropetrovsk border, leveraging the "Rybar" channel's own simulated maps to demonstrate Russian offensive intent. Directly challenge and refute Russian attempts to leverage external political statements (e.g., Trump's comments justifying Russian attacks) to justify their actions or sow discord regarding essential services like Starlink. Correct internal reporting errors (e.g., General Staff dates) for consistency.
   • Action: Provide raw footage, verified BDA, and survivor testimonies (including from the injured children) to international media, human rights organizations, and diplomatic missions. Ensure all official statements directly refute Russian narratives and emphasize the indiscriminate nature of their attacks on civilians, using this as leverage for further military and diplomatic support. Highlight the difference between military targets (Ukraine's deep strikes) and civilian terror (Russia's actions).
4. Reinforce Frontline Defenses on Northern Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk Border, Sumy, and Donetsk Axes and Enhance Counter-Battery/Counter-Drone Fire:
   • Recommendation: Reinforce units on the northern Kharkiv axis (Vovchansk/Tykhe area), Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border (given sustained Russian pressure), Sumy direction (especially around Yunakivka), and Donetsk axis with additional personnel, armor, artillery, and anti-drone capabilities to counter sustained Russian pressure and consolidate Ukrainian defensive lines. Prioritize counter-battery fire against Russian artillery and UAV launch sites, including locations of heavy bomber drones and FPV drone teams. Monitor and counter Russian tactical aviation activity in the Kursk direction if it poses a threat to AFU positions.
   • Action: Prioritize resupply of munitions and critical equipment to these frontline units. Implement robust counter-battery fire systems and deploy additional anti-drone/EW measures, specifically targeting FPV and heavy bomber drones to protect high-value assets and forward positions. Enhance ISR capabilities to detect any enemy force buildup or shift in operational tempo, particularly along the Vremivka-Dnipropetrovsk axis and in the Sumy direction. Actively seek to understand Russian ground tactical objectives in the Sumy region.
5. Maintain and Diversify Deep Strike Capabilities with Enhanced OPSEC, While Monitoring Naval Threats:
   • Recommendation: Continue to leverage and diversify deep strike capabilities to target Russian military-industrial complex sites, airfields, and logistical nodes within Russia. Analyze Russian counter-UAV tactics to adapt and improve drone penetration, especially given claimed high interception rates around Moscow. While the immediate naval missile threat is low, monitor the return of Kalibr carriers and be prepared for renewed air-launched missile attacks from tactical aviation operating in the south.
   • Action: Identify and prioritize high-value targets, including known UAV production facilities, strategic bomber airfields, and major fuel depots that support direct aggression against Ukraine. Maintain strict operational security for deep strike missions to maximize impact and minimize attribution, forcing Russia to divert resources to internal air defense and potentially impacting their ability to mount further large-scale retaliatory strikes. Develop contingency plans for naval missile re-engagement if Kalibr carriers return to operational zones.

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END OF REPORT