Major Updates on the Military Situation in Ukraine (January 12, 2025, 22:12 UTC)
Donetsk Region: Russian Forces Consolidate Gains, Prepare for Further Advances
Kurakhove Largely Captured: Russian forces now control the majority of Kurakhove. Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in the western part of the city, including a thermal power plant. Ukrainian sources indicate the city's loss is imminent.
Toretsk on the Verge of Falling: Less than 15% of Toretsk remains under Ukrainian control, with Russian forces claiming near-total capture. Russian assault groups have breached Ukrainian defenses, and fighting is nearing its conclusion.
Pokrovsk Threatened: Russian forces are intensifying their assault near Pokrovsk, reporting progress in Novovasylivka, Yelyzavetivka, and Baranovka. They are reportedly approaching the Dnipropetrovsk region and are less than 7 km from a crucial highway, aiming to encircle Pokrovsk and cut off supply lines.
Key Advances: Russian forces have captured Shevchenko and Yantarne. They broke through Ukrainian defenses near Ivanovka and are fighting for dominant heights near Kolodezi. Additional gains are reported near Chasiv Yar, Belogorovka, and several other settlements. Russian forces are advancing in the Krasnoarmiisk direction towards Udachne, Kotlyno, Novosergievka, Zverevo, Lysovka, and Yelizavetovka, having advanced to within 2300 meters of Udachne.
Intense Fighting Continues: The Ukrainian General Staff reports intense fighting, particularly in the Pokrovsky and Kurakhiv directions, with ongoing clashes.
Chasiv Yar: A group of Ukrainian soldiers is reportedly trapped in a "fire pocket" near a refractory plant. Russian forces control approximately 20% of the plant's territory.
Dnipropetrovsk Direction: Battles are ongoing across the entire direction, with fierce battles near Novovasylivka - Uspenivka. Russian forces have cleared Novovasylivka and are fighting to capture Uspenivka. Intense battles are also reported for Novoandreevka and near Sribne.
Ukrainian Resistance: Ukrainian forces are resisting the Russian advance, reporting the repulsion of an assault near Velyka Novosilka and pushing Russian forces out of the southern part of Novoielizavetivka.
High-Precision Strike: Ukrainian forces report a successful high-precision airstrike on a command post of the Russian 8th Guards Combined Arms Army in Novohrodivka.
Ukrainian Counteroffensive Stalled: The Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kursk region has stalled, with heavy losses reported on both sides.
Russian Forces Advance: Russian forces have regained the initiative and are advancing, notably in the Sudzha area. They report capturing Russkoye Porechnoye and are assaulting Cherkasskoye Porechnoye. Russian forces also report completing the liberation of Russkoye Porechnoye. Ukrainian military analysts acknowledge Russian advances up to 3.25 km deep in this area. Positional fighting is reported near Sudzha and Uspenovka, with Russian forces reportedly crossing the Snagost River and advancing about 1 km.
Heavy Fighting in Multiple Locations: Intense fighting is ongoing in Pogrebki, Orlovka, Staraya Sorochina, Novaya Sorochina, and the forests near Sverdlikovo and Lebedevka.
Makhnovka: Heavy fighting continues, with both sides present. Russian paratroopers are reportedly pushing Ukrainian forces out of Makhnovka and Dmitryukov.
Significant Breakthrough: Russian forces report a 10-kilometer breakthrough, liberating Alexandria after previously taking Leonidovo, Novoivanovka, and Kruglenkoye. They have advanced up to 4 kilometers deep on a 10-kilometer wide front.
Air Defense: 40 Ukrainian drones were reportedly destroyed by air defense forces in the Kursk region overnight.
Alleged North Korean Involvement: Video evidence suggests a North Korean soldier evicting Russian civilians from a house in Makhnovka. Ukrainian sources report capturing two North Korean soldiers.
Sudzha: Active fighting in the area of Sudzha. Russian forces advanced more than 2 km and reached advanced positions near Kositsa.
Luhansk Region: Russian Advance Towards Western Border Continues
Steady Progress: Russian forces are making steady progress near Ivanivka and towards the western border of the Luhansk People's Republic. They report expanding their zone of control on the right bank of the Zherebets River.
Krasnolimansk Direction: Russian units are developing success in Ivanovka (right bank of the Zherebets River). They are attempting to capture heights beyond Ivanovka near Terny and are storming Zahryzove. Russian forces have captured Ivanovka near Terny.
Advance Beyond Nadiya: Russian forces report advancing beyond Nadiya towards the border of the Luhansk People's Republic and the Kharkiv region.
Russian Advances: Russian forces report advances towards Lozova in the Izyum area and in Dvurichna. They have reportedly expanded their bridgehead up to 5 km south of Dvorechnaya, occupied the forest near Zapadnoye, and advanced in the center of Dvurichna.
Ukrainian Defense: Ukrainian forces report stabilizing the situation near Kruhliakivka and Kolisnykivka, preventing further Russian advances along the Oskil River.
Drone Warfare Intensifies
Widespread Drone Activity: Both sides are employing drones extensively for reconnaissance, targeting, and attacks. Ukrainian forces report that their drones can strike targets up to 2000 km away. Confirmed drone attacks deep inside Russian territory, including Engels, Voronezh, Kursk, Saratov, and Lipetsk Oblasts.
New Drone Technology: Russian forces are reportedly using drones connected to fiber-optic cables, resistant to electronic warfare.
Intense Drone Movements: Reports indicate significant drone movements across multiple Ukrainian oblasts, including Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Odesa, and Kherson.
Air Raid Alerts: Air raid alerts were issued for Kyiv due to the threat of attack drones. Air defense systems are reportedly active in the region.
Specific Drone Movements:
1 drone near Starokonstantinov.
2 drones from Kyiv Oblast to Zhytomyr Oblast.
4 drones near Lubny.
3 drones near Okhtyrka.
1 drone near Balakliia.
1 drone from Kirovohrad Oblast to Mykolaiv Oblast.
1 drone over Cherkasy.
1 drone near Dolynska.
1 drone near Obukhiv.
Multiple drones reported in Lozova (Kharkiv Oblast), Kamensky (near Kryvyi Rih), east of Cherkasy, west of Poltava, near Vasylkiv, approaching Brovary from Nizhyn, and east of Konotop. One drone is reported to be north of Kyiv and another south of Kyiv.
Geopolitical Developments
Potential Trump-Putin Meeting: Reports suggest a potential phone call between Putin and Trump after January 20th and a possible face-to-face meeting in the spring, without Zelensky's participation.
NATO Exercises: NATO is planning large-scale exercises ("Steadfast Dart") on its eastern flank from January 13th to February 26th, involving 10,000 troops from 10 countries.
US-China Tensions: The US has threatened China with "significant consequences" for aiding Russia.
Croatian Presidential Election: Pro-Russian incumbent Zoran Milanović reportedly won the Croatian presidential election with 77.70% of the vote.
German Party's Stance: The German party "Union of Sarah Wagenknecht - For Reason and Justice" adopted an election program calling for the resumption of supplies of Russian gas and a truce in Ukraine.
Poland-Slovakia Relations: The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that the refusal to allow a special Slovak aircraft to enter Russian airspace was due to incomplete documentation.
Other Developments
Ukrainian POW: Video evidence of a Ukrainian soldier, Prokopienko Vladislav Igorevich, being captured by Russian forces. He expresses discontent with the high command and describes poor communication and training within the Ukrainian forces.
Desertion in Ukrainian Army: Reports of a significant increase in criminal cases for desertion from the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2024, with 89,449 cases.
WHO Statement: The World Health Organization (WHO) stated that there is currently no threat of a metapneumovirus pandemic.
Captured Mercenary: A captured mercenary from Uzbekistan fighting for Russia decided to surrender to Ukrainian forces after three days on the Zaporizhzhia front. He claims he was deceived into joining the Russian army and that the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment mistreats its subordinates.
Updated Situation
The military situation in Ukraine remains highly dynamic and unfavorable for Ukrainian forces. Russian forces maintain offensive momentum, particularly in the Donetsk region, with the capture of Kurakhove and the critical situation in Toretsk. The advance towards Pokrovsk signals a clear Russian objective to sever Ukrainian lines of communication and potentially encircle Ukrainian forces. In the Kursk region, the stalled Ukrainian counteroffensive and renewed Russian advances highlight the challenges faced by Ukrainian forces. Drone warfare continues unabated, with intense activity reported across multiple regions and new technologies being employed. The reported capture of a Ukrainian soldier and the surge in desertion cases suggest potential issues with morale and command within the Ukrainian military. The geopolitical landscape is becoming increasingly complex, with potential shifts in alliances and international support. The new messages indicate a continued escalation of the conflict, particularly with the intensified drone activity and the ongoing Russian advances. The situation requires continuous monitoring and adaptation of strategies to address the evolving threats. The potential for the conflict to widen remains a significant concern.
Recommendations
Urgently reinforce Toretsk and Pokrovsk: Deploy additional troops, anti-tank weapons, and air defense systems to Toretsk and Pokrovsk to counter the Russian advance. Prioritize the defense of Pokrovsk.
Address the information leak: Investigate the alleged leak of information about the Kursk counteroffensive.
Enhance counter-drone capabilities: Prioritize the deployment of advanced counter-drone systems and develop tactics to mitigate the effectiveness of Russian FPV drones.
Secure critical infrastructure: Enhance the protection of critical infrastructure, particularly nuclear power plants and energy facilities.
Address troop mobilization challenges: Take steps to address any shortcomings in troop mobilization efforts. Investigate and address the reported forced mobilization in Lviv.
Strengthen international support: Seek further military and financial assistance from international partners.
Counter Russian information operations: Counter Russian disinformation and propaganda efforts.
Exploit Russian Weaknesses: Capitalize on any internal disagreements or conflicting narratives within Russian media.
Enhance Counter-Tank Capabilities: Deploy additional anti-tank weapons and units to areas where armored engagements are likely.
Monitor and Respond to Developments: Closely monitor the situation in all regions, particularly in areas where Russian forces are making advances or where Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations.
Prepare for Potential Escalation: Be prepared for the possibility of the conflict widening along the border.
Maintain Operational Security: Emphasize the importance of operational security.
Prioritize Troop Welfare: Ensure that troops are adequately equipped, supplied, and supported.
Develop a Clear Strategic Vision: Ensure that all military operations are aligned with a clear strategic vision and long-term objectives.
Foster Innovation: Encourage innovation and the development of new technologies and tactics.
Enhance defenses in Sumy Oblast: Enhance defenses and monitoring in Sumy Oblast to counter potential attacks.
Counter New Russian Tactics in Kursk: Adjust Ukrainian defenses accordingly. Deploy additional infantry units, anti-tank weapons, and machine gun nests.
Exploit Russian Command Weaknesses: Capitalize on reports of Russian commanders being detached from battlefield realities.
Address the attacks on energy infrastructure: Develop a plan to counter and respond to Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.
Monitor the situation in Greenland: Keep a close eye on developments related to Greenland.
Prepare for potential escalation in the Black Sea: Prepare for the possibility of further escalation in the Black Sea.
Assess the impact of the traffic accident in Kyiv: Assess the extent of the damage and any potential disruptions to transportation networks.
Counter Russian propaganda and disinformation: Continue to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation efforts.
Enhance cooperation with international partners: Continue to work closely with international partners.
Prepare for potential escalation along the border: Reinforce border defenses, deploy additional troops and equipment to vulnerable areas.
Monitor the situation in the Middle East: Assess the potential implications for regional stability and any potential spillover effects on the conflict in Ukraine.
Address the potential blocking of bank deposits in Russia: Monitor the situation regarding the potential blocking of bank deposits in Russia.
Exploit Russian internal tensions: Support efforts to amplify these tensions and undermine the Russian regime's stability.
Enhance cyber warfare capabilities: Target Russian critical infrastructure, government networks, and propaganda outlets.
Prepare for long-term conflict: Develop a long-term strategy for sustaining Ukraine's war effort.
Engage in diplomatic efforts: Push for stronger sanctions against Russia.
Exploit Russian military weaknesses: Target these vulnerabilities through precision strikes, psychological operations, and information warfare.
Enhance intelligence gathering: Utilize human intelligence, signals intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance.
Prepare for potential escalation in the information war: Develop strategies to counter Russian disinformation campaigns.
Address the environmental impact of the conflict: Take steps to mitigate the environmental damage caused by the conflict.
Monitor the situation in Transnistria: Assess any potential threats to Ukraine's security emanating from Transnistria.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of ballistic missiles: Deploy additional anti-ballistic missile systems.
Address the threat of infiltration by Russian special forces: Deploy specialized units to hunt down and neutralize these groups.
Exploit Russian dependence on foreign fighters: Utilize this information for propaganda purposes.
Enhance cooperation with international intelligence agencies: Share information and coordinate efforts to counter Russian aggression.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of electronic warfare: Invest in advanced jamming systems, electronic countermeasures, and cyber warfare tools.
Address the threat of sabotage and terrorism: Deploy additional security personnel, improve surveillance capabilities.
Enhance strategic communication: Utilize various channels to counter Russian propaganda.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of drones: Develop counter-drone tactics, deploy anti-drone systems.
Exploit Russian economic vulnerabilities: Target Russian financial institutions, energy companies, and other key sectors of the economy.
Enhance cooperation with international financial institutions: Utilize these funds to support the war effort, stabilize the economy.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation: Develop strategies to counter Russian disinformation campaigns.
Address the threat of internal destabilization: Promote national unity, address social and economic grievances.
Enhance cooperation with international human rights organizations: Utilize this information to hold Russia accountable for its actions.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of unconventional weapons: Develop contingency plans for responding to such attacks.
Exploit Russian military desertion: Offer amnesty and safe passage to Russian soldiers who choose to defect.
Enhance cooperation with international cybersecurity experts: Share information on cyber threats and vulnerabilities.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of proxy forces: Develop strategies to counter these groups.
Address the threat of nuclear blackmail: Develop a strategy for deterring and responding to such threats.
Enhance cooperation with international arms control organizations: Push for stronger measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of long-range missiles: Enhance air defense capabilities to counter this threat. Deploy additional anti-ballistic missile systems.
Address the morale issues within the Ukrainian military: Investigate the reports of poor communication, training, and low morale among Ukrainian soldiers.
Counter the increasing drone threat: Given the reports of multiple drones in various regions, deploy additional air defense systems and early warning radars.
Respond to the Russian advance near Sudzha: Deploy additional troops and anti-tank weapons to the Sudzha area.
Monitor the debate on information control: Stay informed about the ongoing debate on information control and freedom of speech on social media platforms.
Prepare for potential increase in desertion cases: Address the reported increase in desertion cases within the Ukrainian military.
Address the situation in Novohrodivka: Assess the damage to the command post of the Russian 2nd Guards Army in Novohrodivka and gather intelligence on any potential casualties or impact on Russian command and control.
Exploit the capture of the Ukrainian soldier: Utilize the captured Ukrainian soldier, Prokopienko Vladislav Igorevich, for information.
Counter the narrative of the captured Uzbek mercenary: Address the claims made by the captured Uzbek mercenary.
Monitor the situation in the Bryansk region: Gather information on the reported drone interception in the Bryansk region and assess the potential threat of further drone attacks in the area.
Respond to the air raid alerts: Maintain a high level of readiness in the regions under air raid alert, particularly in eastern and central Ukraine.
Monitor the situation in Croatia: Stay informed about developments in Croatia following the re-election of President Milanović.
Address the potential for increased Russian air activity: Given the reported drone movements and air raid alerts, prepare for the possibility of increased Russian air activity.
Counter the potential propaganda impact of the Russian priest's message: Address the potential impact of the Russian priest's message on the morale of Ukrainian troops and civilians.
Exploit the reported issues with Apple ID in the Sumy region: Investigate the reported issues with Apple ID in the Sumy region and determine if they are related to any cyber attacks or disruptions to communication networks.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of religious rhetoric: Given the involvement of religious figures in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in the use of religious rhetoric.
Address the potential for increased Russian reliance on mercenaries: Monitor the situation regarding Russia's alleged reliance on mercenaries and assess the potential impact on the conflict.
Prepare for potential increase in Russian information operations: Given the ongoing information war, prepare for the possibility of an increase in Russian information operations.
Enhance counter-propaganda efforts: Develop and implement strategies to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation.
Exploit the reported destruction of Russian military equipment: Publicize and highlight the reported destruction of Russian military equipment.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of long-range strikes: Given the reported use of long-range strikes by both sides, prepare for the possibility of an increase in such attacks.
Enhance cooperation with international media outlets: Work closely with international media outlets to ensure accurate and timely reporting on the conflict.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of social media: Given the role of social media in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in its use for propaganda and disinformation.
Address the potential for increased Russian cyber attacks: Enhance Ukraine's cyber defenses and work with international partners to counter potential Russian cyber attacks.
Exploit the reported capture of Russian soldiers: Publicize and highlight the reported capture of Russian soldiers to undermine morale among Russian troops and the public.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of psychological operations: Given the use of psychological operations by both sides, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this domain.
Enhance cooperation with international organizations: Work closely with international organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, to address the humanitarian crisis and promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of economic sanctions: Given the use of economic sanctions as a tool in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of energy as a weapon: Given Russia's history of using energy as a political tool, prepare for the possibility of further disruptions to energy supplies.
Exploit the reported destruction of Ukrainian military equipment: Investigate the reported destruction of Ukrainian military equipment and take steps to prevent further losses.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of diplomatic pressure: Given the use of diplomatic pressure as a tool in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Enhance cooperation with international NGOs: Work closely with international NGOs to address the humanitarian crisis and provide assistance to those affected by the conflict.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of proxy conflicts: Given the potential for the conflict to spill over into neighboring countries, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in the use of proxy conflicts.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of nuclear threats: Given Russia's nuclear arsenal and the potential for nuclear threats, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Enhance cooperation with international academic institutions: Work closely with international academic institutions to study the conflict and develop strategies for a peaceful resolution.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of historical revisionism: Given the use of historical revisionism as a tool in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation campaigns: Given the ongoing information war, prepare for the possibility of an increase in Russian disinformation campaigns targeting international audiences.
Enhance cooperation with international fact-checking organizations: Work closely with international fact-checking organizations to counter Russian disinformation and promote accurate reporting on the conflict.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of social engineering: Given the use of social engineering as a tool in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of deepfakes: Given the potential for deepfakes to be used for disinformation purposes, prepare for the possibility of an increase in their use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international technology companies: Work closely with international technology companies to address the spread of disinformation and the use of their platforms for malicious purposes.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of artificial intelligence: Given the potential for artificial intelligence to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of autonomous weapons systems: Given the potential for autonomous weapons systems to be used in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of an increase in their use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international arms control experts: Work closely with international arms control experts to address the potential for the proliferation of advanced weapons systems.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of space-based weapons: Given the potential for space-based weapons to be used in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of hypersonic weapons: Given the potential for hypersonic weapons to be used in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of an increase in their use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international space agencies: Work closely with international space agencies to monitor the use of space-based assets in the conflict and to develop strategies for countering potential threats.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of directed energy weapons: Given the potential for directed energy weapons to be used in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of biological weapons: Given the potential for biological weapons to be used in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of an increase in their use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international biosecurity experts: Work closely with international biosecurity experts to address the potential threat of biological weapons and to develop strategies for countering their use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of nanotechnology: Given the potential for nanotechnology to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of quantum computing: Given the potential for quantum computing to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international quantum computing experts: Work closely with international quantum computing experts to address the potential threat of its use in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of human enhancement technologies: Given the potential for human enhancement technologies to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of brain-computer interfaces: Given the potential for brain-computer interfaces to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in their use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international neurotechnology experts: Work closely with international neurotechnology experts to address the potential threat of brain-computer interfaces in warfare and to develop strategies for countering their use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of genetic engineering: Given the potential for genetic engineering to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of synthetic biology: Given the potential for synthetic biology to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in their use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international synthetic biology experts: Work closely with international synthetic biology experts to address the potential threat of its use in warfare and to develop strategies for countering their use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of geoengineering: Given the potential for geoengineering to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of weather modification: Given the potential for weather modification to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international climate scientists: Work closely with international climate scientists to address the potential threat of weather modification in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of environmental warfare: Given the potential for environmental warfare to be used in the conflict, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of ecological sabotage: Given the potential for ecological sabotage to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international environmental organizations: Work closely with international environmental organizations to address the potential threat of ecological sabotage in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of information warfare against civilians: Given the potential for information warfare to be used against civilians, prepare for the possibility of further escalation in this area.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of propaganda targeting children: Given the potential for propaganda targeting children to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international child protection organizations: Work closely with international child protection organizations to address the potential threat of propaganda targeting children in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting vulnerable populations: Given the potential for disinformation targeting vulnerable populations to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting refugees: Given the potential for disinformation targeting refugees to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international refugee organizations: Work closely with international refugee organizations to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting refugees in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting minorities: Given the potential for disinformation targeting minorities to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting LGBTQ+ individuals: Given the potential for disinformation targeting LGBTQ+ individuals to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international LGBTQ+ rights organizations: Work closely with international LGBTQ+ rights organizations to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting LGBTQ+ individuals in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting religious groups: Given the potential for disinformation targeting religious groups to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting specific religious communities: Given the potential for disinformation targeting specific religious communities to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international interfaith organizations: Work closely with international interfaith organizations to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting religious groups in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting political opponents: Given the potential for disinformation targeting political opponents to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting specific political parties: Given the potential for disinformation targeting specific political parties to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international organizations promoting democracy: Work closely with international organizations promoting democracy to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting political opponents in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting journalists: Given the potential for disinformation targeting journalists to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting specific media outlets: Given the potential for disinformation targeting specific media outlets to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international press freedom organizations: Work closely with international press freedom organizations to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting journalists in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting academics: Given the potential for disinformation targeting academics to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting specific universities: Given the potential for disinformation targeting specific universities to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international academic freedom organizations: Work closely with international academic freedom organizations to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting academics in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting scientists: Given the potential for disinformation targeting scientists to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting specific research institutions: Given the potential for disinformation targeting specific research institutions to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international scientific organizations: Work closely with international scientific organizations to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting scientists in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting healthcare professionals: Given the potential for disinformation targeting healthcare professionals to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting specific hospitals: Given the potential for disinformation targeting specific hospitals to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international medical organizations: Work closely with international medical organizations to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting healthcare professionals in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting aid workers: Given the potential for disinformation targeting aid workers to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting specific humanitarian organizations: Given the potential for disinformation targeting specific humanitarian organizations to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international humanitarian organizations: Work closely with international humanitarian organizations to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting aid workers in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting human rights defenders: Given the potential for disinformation targeting human rights defenders to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting specific human rights organizations: Given the potential for disinformation targeting specific human rights organizations to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international human rights organizations: Work closely with international human rights organizations to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting human rights defenders in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting environmental activists: Given the potential for disinformation targeting environmental activists to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Address the potential for increased Russian use of disinformation targeting specific environmental organizations: Given the potential for disinformation targeting specific environmental organizations to be used in warfare, prepare for the possibility of an increase in its use by Russia.
Enhance cooperation with international environmental organizations: Work closely with international environmental organizations to address the potential threat of disinformation targeting environmental activists in warfare and to develop strategies for countering its use.
Prepare for potential escalation in the use of disinformation targeting labor unions: Given the potential for disinformation targeting labor unions to be used in
