Nuclear and Strategic Facilities (IRGC / AEOI Security Context)
Identity
This record is best understood as a site set rather than one installation: the placemarks resolve to Iran’s main declared enrichment and fuel-cycle nodes at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan, plus Parchin’s historically relevant Taleghan 2 area and the separate deep tunnel complex at Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La south of Natanz. The grouping aligns with a security context where declared nuclear facilities, hardening projects and legacy weaponization-linked military areas intersect. ([iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2026-8.pdf))
Natanz and Pickaxe
Natanz remains a major enrichment complex: in the IAEA’s May 2025 report, FEP operated IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4 and IR-6 cascades, while PFEP ran IR-4/IR-6 lines and produced some 60% UF6. After the June 2025 strikes, Grossi reported the above-ground Natanz area destroyed and internal radiological and chemical contamination. South of the main site, ISIS imagery analysis assessed continued excavation, reinforced entrances and added security works at the Pickaxe Mountain tunnel complex, which it assessed as a likely replacement for destroyed centrifuge-assembly capacity at Natanz; that exact mission is not publicly confirmed by the IAEA. ([iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf))
Fordow
Fordow near Qom is the hardened underground Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. In March 2025 Grossi described Fordow as Iran’s main location for enrichment to 60% U-235, and the May 2025 IAEA report showed FFEP configured with both IR-1 and IR-6 cascades. The IAEA confirmed Fordow was hit in the U.S. attacks of 22 June 2025 and, by 27 February 2026, still listed FFEP among the affected facilities that contained declared nuclear material but had not been reopened to Agency verification. ([iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran-20-june-2025))
Isfahan
Isfahan is the key fuel-cycle node in this set. The IAEA lists the Uranium Conversion Facility, Fuel Manufacturing Plant, Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant and Enriched UO2 Powder Plant there, and reported that Iran declared a new Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant on 12 June 2025; as of 27 February 2026, the Agency said it still did not know IFEP’s precise whereabouts or whether it contained nuclear material. The same February 2026 report said satellite imagery showed regular vehicle activity at an Isfahan tunnel complex where UF6 enriched up to 20% and 60% U-235 for four declared facilities was stored, prompting an IAEA request for design-information and inventory verification. ([iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2026-8.pdf))
Parchin
Parchin, including the Taleghan 2 area, is not a current declared nuclear facility, but it remains relevant because of the IAEA’s historical weaponization file. In its 2015 final assessment, the Agency said information indicated a large cylinder suitable for hydrodynamic high-explosive experiments had been installed there in 2000 and that later alteration of the site seriously undermined verification. After the October 2024 Israeli strike, AP imagery showed a destroyed or damaged structure at Parchin; by February 2026 Reuters-published imagery showed the struck area rebuilt and enclosed in concrete and soil, but the present function of the rebuilt structure is not publicly confirmed. ([iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf))
Safeguards
The current security picture is shaped by the post-war verification gap. In its 27 February 2026 report, the IAEA said Iran had not provided access to any of its four declared enrichment facilities during the reporting period and that the Agency therefore could not state the current size, composition or whereabouts of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile or whether enrichment had stopped. Using pre-attack data, the Agency estimated that Iran held 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 as of 13 June 2025; Grossi had already warned in September 2025 that verification of Iran’s high-enriched uranium had become overdue and that without full safeguards implementation the Agency could not provide assurance on the programme. ([iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2026-8.pdf))