The listed sites cover major pillars of Russia's defense-industrial complex: solid-propellant ballistic missile manufacture (Votkinsk Machine Building Plant), historical and current nuclear fuel cycle activities including legacy weapons-grade plutonium production and modern spent fuel services (Mining and Chemical Combine, Krasnoyarsk-26/Zheleznogorsk), explosives and ammunition production (Morozov Plant, identification not unique in open sources), electronic warfare and tactical communications development and testing (JSC Concern Sozvezdie and its proving grounds), nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly with associated highly enriched uranium component work (the large warhead assembly complex commonly identified with Lesnoy), depot-level maintenance of air defense assets (502nd Military Property Repair Plant), systems installation and life-cycle support for air and missile defense and space-domain ground systems (Leading Production and Technical Enterprise Granit within Almaz-Antey), multiple launch rocket system design and production (NPO Splav, Tula), and launcher and missile ground equipment testing within Almaz-Antey (Design Bureau for Special Machine-Building test facility).
A core production center for solid-fuel strategic and operational missiles, the Votkinsk plant is associated in open sources with final assembly of RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) and RT-2PM2 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as the RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32) submarine-launched ballistic missile; it has also been reported to produce the 9M723 ballistic missile for the 9K720 Iskander-M system. Historically, the plant manufactured the RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20) IRBM. Under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the facility was subject to continuous U.S. portal and perimeter monitoring from 1988 until 2001. The enterprise remains a critical node in the solid-propellant missile supply chain, working closely with design bureaus such as the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology; production rates and specific logistics details are not publicly disclosed.
Established in 1950 in the closed city now known as Zheleznogorsk, the Mining and Chemical Combine (part of Rosatom) historically hosted underground graphite-moderated plutonium production reactors; the last such reactor, ADE-2, ceased operation in April 2010 under the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (1997, amended 2003). The site now focuses on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, including centralized spent nuclear fuel storage, a pilot demonstration center for reprocessing commissioned in 2015, and a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plant that supplies MOX fuel for the BN-800 fast reactor. Legacy weapons plutonium production has ended; current operations emphasize storage, recycling technologies, and fuel fabrication within Rosatom’s nuclear materials management framework.
Open-source references to a Morozov Plant in Russia correspond to more than one enterprise, and without a confirmed municipality or corporate identifier the site cannot be uniquely attributed. Facilities bearing the Morozov name are reported to engage in explosives and ammunition production, typically encompassing cast and pressed high explosives, propellants, detonators and fuzes, and charges for artillery and rocket munitions. Many such munitions enterprises are organized under Rostec’s ammunition holding (Tekhmash). In the absence of a precise location, only this generalized functional profile can be stated; definitive attribution would require city or corporate registration details.
Sozvezdie is a leading Russian developer and manufacturer of tactical communications and electronic warfare systems. It has been a core enterprise within Rostec’s radio-electronics consolidation (historically under the United Instrument Manufacturing Corporation and later integrated with Ruselectronics structures). Notable outputs cited in open sources include the R-168 Akveduk family of digital radios, the ESU TZ Sozvezdie series of automated command-and-control systems, and the RB-301B Borisoglebsk-2 electronic warfare complex. The concern provides equipment spanning HF/VHF/UHF tactical communications, data links, command post automation, and EW jamming and counter-jamming suites. Entities within the concern have been subject to U.S. and EU sanctions since 2014.
The concern operates dedicated proving grounds for communications and electronic warfare systems used to validate radio-frequency performance, interoperability, electromagnetic compatibility, environmental resilience, and jamming effectiveness. Open sources indicate test infrastructure in the Voronezh and Tambov regions aligned to development centers, but detailed site layouts, instrumentation suites, and specific test program data are not publicly released. These ranges support acceptance testing and MoD qualification of tactical radios, data transmission equipment, and EW complexes produced by Sozvezdie and affiliated enterprises.
Russia’s principal nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly activities are widely associated in open sources with the Elektrokhimpribor Combine in Lesnoy (the closed city formerly designated Sverdlovsk-45), part of Rosatom. The site has long been described as the largest complex of its kind in Russia, handling assembly, disassembly, inspection, and lifecycle management of warheads and associated highly enriched uranium components under strict security. A second warhead assembly/disassembly capability exists at Trekhgorny (Zlatoust-36). Operational details such as throughput, precise processes, storage configurations, and security protocols are classified and not publicly available.
The 502nd Military Repair Plant is identified in Russian Ministry of Defense and industry reporting as a depot-level maintenance and overhaul facility for air defense materiel. Its responsibilities encompass restoration and calibration of launchers, command posts, radar and support vehicles, and selected missile-related components for systems in the air defense inventory. The plant functions within the MoD’s repair base supporting the Aerospace Forces’ air defense units, conducting diagnostics, refurbishment, and life-extension work. Detailed equipment lists, production capacity, and site-specific infrastructure are not publicly disclosed.
LPTE Granit is an Almaz-Antey enterprise specializing in field installation, integration, commissioning, maintenance, and end-of-life disposal of complex weapon and sensor systems. Open-source descriptions emphasize its role in supporting air defense (such as S-300/S-400 family), missile defense, early warning radar networks, space surveillance systems, and other Space Forces infrastructure. The enterprise provides on-site docking, configuration, acceptance testing, technical servicing, and restoration tasks directly at customer locations, acting as a lifecycle service integrator across strategic radar fields and air and missile defense nodes.
NPO Splav named after A. N. Ganichev, based in Tula and part of Rostec’s Tekhmash ammunition holding, is Russia’s principal developer and producer of multiple launch rocket systems and rockets. Legacy and current systems include 9K51 Grad (122 mm), 9K57 Uragan (220 mm), and 9K58 Smerch (300 mm), along with modernized variants such as Tornado-G (9K51M) and Tornado-S (9K515). The product line spans a broad range of rockets and warheads, including high explosive, thermobaric, cargo/cluster submunitions, and remote mining munitions; modern guided 300 mm rockets for Tornado-S (e.g., 9M544/9M549) are reported with ranges up to approximately 120 km. Splav’s systems have been widely exported; the enterprise and affiliated holding entities have been under U.S. and EU sanctions since 2014.
The Design Bureau for Special Machine-Building (KB SM), based in Saint Petersburg within Almaz-Antey, develops ground and naval launcher systems, transporter-erector-launchers, canisters, and associated infrastructure. Its dedicated test facilities support structural, vibration, thermal, electrical, and environmental qualification of air defense launchers (S-300/S-400 and related families), naval vertical launch systems (such as universal shipborne launchers), and specialized ground equipment used by air defense, the Navy, and the Strategic Missile Troops. Specific test site locations, instrumentation details, and program schedules are not publicly disclosed due to security constraints.
The Votkinsk Machine Building Plant was subject to continuous U.S. portal and perimeter monitoring from 1988 to 2001 under the INF Treaty’s verification regime, reflecting its role in production of missiles relevant to treaty constraints. At Krasnoyarsk-26, the shutdown of the ADE-2 reactor in 2010 fulfilled obligations under the 1997 Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (as amended in 2003), ending weapons-grade plutonium production at that site. No comparable public verification regimes currently apply to the listed enterprises; operational details at nuclear warhead assembly and sensitive test facilities remain classified.
Mining and Chemical Combine (Zheleznogorsk) and the warhead assembly complex at Lesnoy are part of the Rosatom state corporation. JSC Concern Sozvezdie is consolidated under Rostec’s radio-electronics holdings (formerly the United Instrument Manufacturing Corporation, later integrated with Ruselectronics structures). NPO Splav is part of Rostec’s Tekhmash ammunition holding. LPTE Granit and the Design Bureau for Special Machine-Building are enterprises of Almaz-Antey, the state air and missile defense concern. The 502nd Military Repair Plant operates under the Ministry of Defense. Corporate structures and shareholding at these entities are state-directed; detailed internal ownership stakes and contractual arrangements are not comprehensively disclosed in public sources.
For several sites listed (notably warhead assembly activities at Lesnoy, specific Sozvezdie and Almaz-Antey test ground locations, and detailed workflows at repair plants), granular data such as precise coordinates, facility layouts, production or refurbishment rates, and security procedures are not publicly available or are classified. The analysis above relies on verifiable open-source facts including treaty histories, publicly attributed product lines, corporate affiliations, and historical roles; any operational details beyond these are withheld by authorities or not released into the public domain.