The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (commonly known as the GRU; officially the GU) is the Ministry of Defence’s military intelligence service, responsible for foreign military intelligence collection and analysis, clandestine and special operations, signals and cyber intelligence, technical reconnaissance (including space-related tasks), and training of intelligence personnel. The entity is widely associated in open sources with military unit (v/ch) 45807 as its headquarters identifier. The units listed—ranging from intelligence centers and training institutions to special service centers, receiving/transmitting nodes, and logistics bases—reflect the GRU’s vertically integrated structure that combines collection, processing, operations, technical support, and education under a single command.
Admiral Igor Olegovich Kostyukov has led the GRU since 2018, after serving as a deputy head; multiple state sanctions regimes list him by name in connection with the organization’s activities. Publicly available information identifies him as holding the naval rank of Admiral and heading the Main Directorate (GU) of the General Staff. Further internal command assignments within the Directorate are not publicly disclosed.
GRU headquarters is widely referenced in open sources under military unit 45807, with central data handling and communications nodes supporting command-and-control continuity. The 476th Central Information Reception and Processing Point (v/ch 03770) and the 918th Receiving and Transmitting Information Center (v/ch 47126) are identified as core information-transfer and processing elements, while the communications node (v/ch 40907) appears in open-source listings as a dedicated signal relay/terminus. These entities collectively underpin secure, high-availability communications and data dissemination between collection units, analytic centers, and operational components.
The 85th Main Special Service Center (v/ch 26165) is publicly and repeatedly attributed by governments to offensive cyber operations; the U.S. Department of Justice indictments unsealed on 13 July 2018 and 4 October 2018 identify Unit 26165 personnel in relation to intrusions and information operations against foreign targets. Open sources also reference the 99th Main Special Service Center (v/ch 51428), the 162nd Military-Technical Information Center (v/ch 54023), and the 6th Military-Technical Information Center for Researching the Military Potential of Foreign States (v/ch 54726) as technical-analysis or special-service entities; detailed mandates and internal structures for these units are not publicly confirmed. The 316th Reconnaissance Center (v/ch 09920) is reported in open sources as countering technical means of foreign intelligence, and the 136th Special Service Center (v/ch 61535) appears among GRU technical-support elements; in all cases, specific capabilities beyond general signals/cyber/intelligence functions are not disclosed in official sources.
The 161st Preparation Center (v/ch 29155) is publicly linked by multiple European governments and investigative bodies to clandestine activities abroad. The United Kingdom publicly attributed the 2018 Salisbury nerve-agent attack to the GRU; suspects identified by UK authorities used alias identities later connected by open-source investigations to GRU officers linked to Unit 29155. The Czech Republic in April 2021 publicly attributed the 2014 Vrbetice ammunition depot explosions to GRU operatives associated with this unit. Additional allegations regarding Montenegro (2016) have been made by local authorities and European partners. Russia has not publicly confirmed the unit’s mission; operational details remain classified.
The 45th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (v/ch 28337) is an elite formation of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), not subordinated to the GRU but often operating in coordination with military intelligence. Open sources place the brigade in the Kubinka area (Moscow Oblast). Public reporting over the last decade has identified Major General Vadim Pankov as a commander of this formation; official current assignments can change and are not always publicly announced. The brigade’s mission set includes deep reconnaissance, direct action, target acquisition, and special reconnaissance in support of joint-force operations; open-source reporting has linked elements of the unit to operations in Crimea (2014) and subsequent combat in Ukraine.
GRU-affiliated training infrastructure includes the 462nd Training Center (v/ch 62986), the 849th Training Center for Junior Specialists in special radio communications (v/ch 17845), the 152nd Preparation Center (v/ch 06410), and the 7th Central Advanced Courses for Intelligence Officers (v/ch 36360). These institutions provide initial and advanced instruction in tradecraft, special radio communications, signals collection basics, intelligence analysis, and mission preparation. The 161st Preparation Center (v/ch 29155) is also explicitly designated as a preparation/operational training center in open sources, though the specific curriculum and selection criteria are not publicly disclosed.
The 78th Intelligence Center (v/ch 35555), the 539th Separate Intelligence Center (v/ch 10199), the 132nd Command Intelligence Center (v/ch 23305), and the 172nd Command Intelligence Center (v/ch 64501) are cited in open sources as GRU intelligence centers that provide command-level reconnaissance support. Typical functions at this echelon include multi-source intelligence fusion, COMINT/ELINT processing, direction finding cueing, order-of-battle analysis, and dissemination of intelligence products to Military District and General Staff consumers. Precise locations, assigned areas of responsibility, and sensor tasking authorities for these centers are not publicly released.
The 2357th Separate Radio Direction Finding Battalion (v/ch 49555) and the 740th Separate Information Receiving and Processing Point (v/ch 54341) are associated with radio-technical reconnaissance. RDF battalions typically operate fixed and mobile line-of-bearing and time-difference-of-arrival systems across HF/VHF/UHF bands to geolocate emitters and characterize communications activity, while receiving/processing points handle intake, initial signal conditioning, and forwarding to higher-echelon centers for exploitation. Equipment types, coverage footprints, and detailed tasking for these units are not publicly disclosed.
Open-source references identify the 407th Separate Space Objects Radio Emissions Reconnaissance Point (v/ch 63553) and the 1580th Separate Space Objects Radio Emissions Reconnaissance Point (v/ch 51870) as elements focused on the detection, collection, and characterization of radio-frequency emissions from satellites and other space objects. A GRU-linked “Space Reconnaissance Unit” (v/ch 51430) is also cited in open sources, though without publicly available, authoritative detail. Russian space-domain intelligence responsibilities are divided among several organizations, and the exact command relationships and technical architectures for GRU space-SIGINT activities are not officially published.
Core communications and data-handling entities include the 476th Central Information Reception and Processing Point (v/ch 03770), the 918th Receiving and Transmitting Information Center (v/ch 47126), the communications node (v/ch 40907), and the 740th Separate Information Receiving and Processing Point (v/ch 54341). These facilities support secure, encrypted transport over terrestrial, HF, and satellite networks; provide routing, buffering, and validation of incoming collection; and ensure dissemination of intelligence to operational consumers. Physical layouts, link topologies, crypto suites, and throughput specifications are not publicly available.
The 547th Repair and Storage of Special Equipment Warehouse (v/ch 92403) and the 37th Automobile Base (v/ch 44696) provide technical sustainment and mobility support. The warehouse function covers storage, repair, and life-cycle support of specialized intelligence and communications equipment; the automobile base manages vehicle fleets, drivers, maintenance, and dispatch to support training, collection deployments, and headquarters transport requirements. Inventory levels, specific equipment types, and readiness rates are classified and not publicly released.
The 177th Separate Technology Development Management Center (v/ch 40904) appears in open sources as a research-and-development management entity supporting specialized intelligence capabilities. The 316th Reconnaissance Center (v/ch 09920) is reported as tasked with countering the technical means of foreign intelligence, which typically includes counter-SIGINT, denial-and-deception, and protection against foreign sensor exploitation. Detailed program portfolios, test sites, and vendor relationships for these units are not in the public domain.
Open sources commonly cite GRU headquarters at 76 Khoroshevskoe Shosse, Moscow (v/ch 45807). The 45th Separate Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (v/ch 28337) is widely reported as based in Kubinka, Moscow Oblast. The U.S. Department of Justice filings in 2018 identified a Moscow address on Komsomolsky Prospekt associated with Unit 26165 (85th Main Special Service Center). Additional precise addresses for the units listed are generally not published in official Russian sources; where mentioned in media or procurement records, they are subject to change and potential cover designations.
Multiple governments have publicly attributed cyber and covert-action activities to GRU units. U.S. Department of Justice indictments on 13 July 2018 and 4 October 2018 named GRU officers from Unit 26165 (and the separate Unit 74455, not listed here) in connection with computer intrusions and influence operations. The United Kingdom publicly attributed the 2018 Salisbury attack to the GRU, naming suspects; subsequent open-source investigations linked those individuals to Unit 29155. The Czech government in April 2021 publicly connected Unit 29155-linked operatives to the 2014 Vrbetice depot explosions. Various U.S., EU, and UK sanctions regimes list GRU as an entity, senior GRU officials including Igor Kostyukov, and specific officers associated with these activities. Official Russian sources dispute these attributions; detailed operational evidence remains classified by the states making the claims.
Russian military units are routinely identified by military unit numbers (v/ch), which appear in personnel documents, procurement records, and some court filings. These identifiers can persist through reorganizations or be reallocated; cover names and non-descriptive titles are common. The provided list contains duplicate entries for the 2357th Separate Radio Direction Finding Battalion (v/ch 49555) and the 1580th Separate Space Objects Radio Emissions Reconnaissance Point (v/ch 51870); these refer to the same units, not separate entities. Many technical specifics—locations, manning, equipment holdings, networks, and detailed missions—are not publicly available or are classified; where details above rely on public indictments, official statements, or widely cited open sources, this is explicitly stated.