This record is best assessed as a distributed IRGC command-and-maritime network rather than a single installation. On the Tehran side, Tharallah Headquarters is described in recent Farsi-document-based research as the crisis command for the capital, able to take control of police, Basij, Intelligence Ministry, and IRGC assets in Tehran during major unrest. On the Gulf side, the IRGC Navy had relocated its headquarters to Bandar Abbas by 2010, and the 1st Naval District there was assessed in 2021 as the command-and-control center for shipping into and out of the Strait of Hormuz. ([unitedagainstnucleariran.com](https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%2026.pdf))
Tharallah is the strongest verified Tehran placemark in this record. UANI says it was established in 1995 and, in a 'red' crisis, becomes the unified military and intelligence command for Tehran and Alborz. The second Tehran-area placemark, the Imam Ali/Quds Force complex west of Tehran, is less certain: a CSIS imagery case study examined an Imam Ali training facility west of Tehran, and NCRI reporting places a Quds Force training directorate at an Imam Ali garrison on the Tehran-Karaj axis, but the exact footprint and current function at the supplied coordinate are not publicly confirmed. ([unitedagainstnucleariran.com](https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%2026.pdf))
The Bandar Abbas placemark is most consistent with the IRGC Navy headquarters/1st Naval District area, although public sources do not uniquely identify a single compound at the provided coordinate. MEI's July 2021 order of battle places IRGC Navy headquarters and the 1st Naval District in Bandar Abbas, tasked with control of shipping into and out of Hormuz, and notes associated special-commando, coastal-missile, and surface-combat elements. The same source and an INSS military survey both place IRGC naval presence on Qeshm; MEI specifically describes the 112th Zolfaghar surface-combat brigade on Qeshm and cites Qeshm-based surveillance posts and marine units watching the traffic lanes immediately inside the Gulf. ([mei.edu](https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2021-11/The%20IRGC%20and%20the%20Persian%20Gulf%20Region%20in%20a%20Period%20of%20Contested%20Deterrence_0.pdf))
Larak is supported in open sources as a forward Strait outpost, but with less public detail than Bandar Abbas or Qeshm. A Washington Institute study using declassified Iran-Iraq War-era records says Iran's First Naval District created subordinate headquarters on Larak, Abu Musa, and near the Strait entrance for tracking shipping and relaying data back to Bandar Abbas; an INSS order-of-battle also lists Larak among IRGC naval bases. Public sources reviewed do not confirm the current unit mix at the supplied Larak coordinate. ([washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus95.pdf))
Bushehr aligns with the IRGC Navy's 2nd Naval District. MEI's 2021 assessment assigns Bushehr responsibility for the northern and central Persian Gulf, including Kharg oil terminal and the Bushehr nuclear plant, and notes Shahid Mahalati base, a naval air station, a marine brigade, and coastal-missile units there. Subsequent reporting placed a large IRGC naval drill off Bushehr and Khuzestan in January 2025, indicating the district remains an active operating hub. ([mei.edu](https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2021-11/The%20IRGC%20and%20the%20Persian%20Gulf%20Region%20in%20a%20Period%20of%20Contested%20Deterrence_0.pdf))
The southern placemarks together support a layered Hormuz posture: Bandar Abbas as headquarters and district command-and-control, Qeshm and Larak as island or outpost positions astride approaches to the strait, and Bushehr as the hub for the northern and central Gulf. MEI assesses that the shipping separation zones immediately inside the Gulf run through Iranian territorial waters covered by IRGC posts on several islands including Qeshm, while IRGC statements during a February 17, 2026 exercise stressed 24-hour surveillance and rapid-response boarding or seizure readiness in Hormuz. This makes the record consistent with command, surveillance, missile, and fast-craft infrastructure oriented to coercive control of Gulf shipping rather than a single self-contained base. ([mei.edu](https://www.mei.edu/publications/irgc-and-persian-gulf-region-period-contested-deterrence))