This record identifies the Belarusian Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, not a single barracks site. Belarus’s official OSCE submission states that the interior minister leads the force and the commander—by office a deputy interior minister—directly manages it through the main command. As of the UK sanctions list dated February 26, 2025, Nikolay Karpenkov was still listed as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Commander of the Internal Troops; recent Belarus state reporting also referred to him as the commander and a major general. Open sources confirm the MVD central complex at 4 Gorodskogo Val, Minsk, but a separate public postal address for the Internal Troops main command is not clearly confirmed. ([osce.org](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/4/100682.pdf))
Belarus’s cited law, reproduced in official OSCE submissions, assigns the Internal Troops a mixed internal-security mission: assisting police in public-order and public-safety tasks; supporting emergency or martial-law regimes; guarding penal institutions, special cargos, and especially important state objects; convoying detainees and prisoners; searching for escapees; responding to bomb threats and unexploded ordnance; and participating in territorial defense. This explains why the force combines garrison, convoy, EOD, and special-purpose functions under one command. ([osce.org](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/4/100682.pdf))
The direct placemark for the training center aligns with the Internal Troops training complex "Volovshchina" associated with military unit 5448 near Minsk. A Belarus government program states that in 2019–2020 project documentation was prepared for reconstruction of the firing range at the Volovshchina training center of military unit 5448, and that the 2021–2025 program funded broader reconstruction there. The stated goal was to create a center for training special units of the armed forces, other troops, military formations, and militarized organizations for joint national-security tasks. Waze also links military unit 5448 to the Internal Troops contact page on the MVD site, supporting the unit identification. ([backend.hrlib.kz](https://backend.hrlib.kz/api/pdf/ru/documents/38%20%D0%92%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%85%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE%20%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0/2%20%D0%97%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE%20%D0%BF%D0%BE%20%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BC/%D0%91%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D1%8C/2021%20%D0%9E%D0%B1%20%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B6%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8%20%D0%93%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B9%20%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BC%D1%8B%20%C2%AB%D0%9E%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8F%D0%B4%D0%BA%D0%B0%C2%BB%20%D0%BD%D0%B0%202021%E2%80%932025%20%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%8B%20%28%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82.%20%D0%A1%D0%9C%20%D0%A0%D0%91%29%20%D1%81%20%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BC.%20%D0%BE%D1%82%2025.11.2024.pdf))
The direct placemark for the 6th Separate Special Police Brigade is consistent with military unit 5525 in Gomel. Recent procurement listings place v/ch 5525 in Gomel, and Belarus state media described the unit conducting tactical-special training against sabotage-reconnaissance groups and illegal armed formations, including engineering reconnaissance, combat support, and use of reconnaissance and strike UAVs. Separate state reporting on the same unit highlighted sapper-pyrotechnic capability and convoy duties, matching the Internal Troops’ statutory mission set. ([zakupki.kontur.ru](https://zakupki.kontur.ru/SNG4119595?utm_source=openai))
Open-source evidence points to an Internal Troops system centered on Minsk command functions, a modernized special-unit training node at Volovshchina/v\u002Fch 5448, and regional maneuver or security units such as Gomel’s v\u002Fch 5525 training for DRG/NVF scenarios and UAV-enabled internal-security missions. This is an inference from the cited legal authorities, infrastructure plans, and unit exercise reporting, not a public confirmation of the force’s full current wartime order of battle. ([osce.org](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/4/100682.pdf))