This record is best understood as the IRGC Aerospace Force ballistic-missile, production, and missile/space test network rather than a single installation. EU sanctions records state that the IRGC Air Force operates Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and that the IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command appears to exercise operational control over Fateh-110 and Ashura missiles; CRS likewise states that the IRGC Air Force operates Iran’s ballistic missile forces. ([eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2075/oj/eng))
Authoritative open sources consistently place IRGC missile bunkers, silos, and tunnel infrastructure in western Iran around Kermanshah and Khorramabad, with CRS also mapping apparent silo sites near Tabriz. NTI describes Imam Ali near Khorramabad as one of Iran’s two silo missile bases, with storage and launch facilities plus mobile TEL activity. During the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, AP imagery showed damage at missile bases near Kermanshah and Tabriz, while Critical Threats/ISW reported severe damage at the Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) base, including an above-ground storage facility and six bunker entrances. ([congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R42849/R42849.4.pdf))
Khojir southeast of Tehran is the clearest verified production node in this record. In January 2026 the EU listed "Khojir Missile Development and Production" as a Tehran Province complex that leads Iran’s ballistic-missile program, is used to produce multiple missile types including solid-fuel systems, is managed by the IRGC and MODAFL, and has expanded substantially in recent years. Separate EU sanctions list Shahid Kharrazi Industries in the Khojir region as a subordinate of SBIG that develops guidance and control systems for solid-propellant ballistic missiles. AP satellite reporting also showed damage at Khojir in October 2024, and by September 2025 AP assessed that Iran had begun rebuilding missile-production sites but still lacked key planetary mixers for solid-fuel production. ([eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32026R0262))
Semnan and Shahroud are the network’s most clearly verified test and launch nodes. CRS states that Iran relies primarily on the Semnan space-launch complex; CSIS records a Khorramshahr MRBM test from near Semnan in January 2017 and a Simorgh launch from the Imam Khomeini Space Centre at Semnan in July 2017. NTI describes Shahroud as an IRGC facility for development, testing, and launches of solid-propellant missiles and SLVs, and CSIS links the April 2020 Noor-1 military satellite launch to an IRGC base near Shahroud. UK sanctions issued on 10 September 2024 said the IRGC Aerospace Force Space Command oversees SLV testing that has supported development of Iran’s long-range ballistic-missile arsenal. AP imagery in October 2024 showed a major building destroyed at the Guard’s Shahroud base, and AP reported in September 2025 that Shahroud was among the solid-fuel manufacturing bases being rebuilt after the June 2025 war. ([congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R42849/R42849.4.pdf))
The supplied placemarks are unevenly verifiable. The sources reviewed here strongly support IRGC missile infrastructure near Kermanshah, Khorramabad, Tabriz, Khojir, Semnan, and Shahroud, and older CRS mapping also notes missile deployments or test activity near Shiraz and Qom; however, the exact identities of several placemarks in this record—including separate north/south Tabriz labels, the Qom and Shiraz site names, the Chitgar/Dastvareh headquarters label, the Eshtehard "Shahid Soltani" entry, and the Khorgo coastal base—are not publicly confirmed at the exact-site level in the authoritative sources reviewed. ([congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R42849/R42849.4.pdf))