GRI 8000
Organizational and Command Geography (2024)
As of 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense re-established the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, dividing the former Western Military District. Headquarters are publicly reported as follows: Leningrad Military District in Saint Petersburg, Moscow Military District in Moscow, Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don, Central Military District in Yekaterinburg, and Eastern Military District in Khabarovsk. The Northern Fleet, which previously held the status of a joint strategic command, reverted to a fleet command within the Navy structure. This reorganization affects the command-and-control footprint across Russia’s northwest approaches, central-western corridor, and the southwestern theater adjacent to Ukraine.
Strategic Rocket Forces Basing and Composition
Open sources indicate the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) operate a mix of silo-based and road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles across multiple divisions. Notable divisions and areas include: Teikovo (21st Guards; RS-24 Yars, road-mobile), Yoshkar-Ola (14th; Yars, road-mobile), Novosibirsk (39th; Yars, road-mobile), Nizhny Tagil/Sverdlovsk Oblast (42nd; Yars, road-mobile), Irkutsk (29th; Yars, road-mobile), Barnaul/Altai Krai (35th; Yars, road-mobile), Vypolzovo/Tver Oblast (7th Guards; Yars, road-mobile), Kozelsk/Kaluga Oblast (28th Guards; RS-24 Yars, silo-based), Tatishchevo/Saratov Oblast (60th; silo-based ICBMs transitioning from Topol-M/UR-100NUTTH to Yars), Uzhur/Krasnoyarsk Krai (62nd; R-36M2 silo-based), and Dombarovsky/Yasny, Orenburg Oblast (13th; R-36M2 silo-based, plus Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle on modified UR-100NUTTH). Exact numbers and deployment patterns are not officially disclosed.
Long-Range Aviation Airfields
Russia’s Long-Range Aviation operates strategic bomber and tanker fleets from several principal bases. Engels Air Base (Saratov Oblast) hosts Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers and has been the main western hub for nuclear-capable aviation. Dyagilevo (Ryazan Oblast) functions as a bomber/tanker base and training center with Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS, and Il-78 tanker activity. In the northwest, Olenya (Murmansk Oblast) has been used for forward deployments. In the Far East, Ukrainka (Amur Oblast) hosts Tu-95MS, with Belaya (Irkutsk Oblast) supporting bomber operations. Additional Tu-22M3 operations are associated with Shaikovka (Kaluga Oblast) and Soltsy-2 (Novgorod Oblast). Public reporting documents multiple drone and missile attacks against Engels and Dyagilevo since December 2022.
Tactical Aviation and Forward Aviation Hubs
Key tactical aviation hubs supporting western and southern theaters include Voronezh/Baltimor (Su-34), Morozovsk (Su-34), Millerovo (Su-30SM), Primorsko-Akhtarsk (Su-34), Krymsk (fighter/ground-attack), and Yeysk (naval aviation training and operational activity), among others. These bases support strike, fighter, and close air support missions, as well as training and testing functions. The specific unit compositions fluctuate due to rotations and wartime demands, and precise aircraft counts at any location are not publicly confirmed.
Naval Strategic Submarine Bases (Northern and Pacific Fleets)
The Northern Fleet’s principal submarine infrastructure lies on the Kola Peninsula. Gadzhiyevo (Murmansk Oblast) is a core ballistic missile submarine homeport, historically supporting Delta IV (Project 667BDRM) and newer Borei-class SSBNs. Additional submarine support facilities exist around Polyarny and in Severomorsk’s vicinity, with major construction and overhaul capacity in Severodvinsk at Sevmash (new construction) and Zvezdochka (repairs). In the Pacific Fleet, the strategic submarine base is at Vilyuchinsk (Rybachiy) on the Kamchatka Peninsula, homeporting Borei-class SSBNs. Public sources indicate ongoing modernization of piers, shelters, and support infrastructure at both polar fleets.
Surface Fleet Bases and Repair Yards
The Northern Fleet’s surface units are centered at Severomorsk and nearby Kola Bay facilities. The Baltic Fleet operates primarily from Baltiysk (Kaliningrad Oblast), with additional facilities near Kronstadt and St. Petersburg, supported by the Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad. The Black Sea Fleet is headquartered in Sevastopol (occupied Crimea), with a significant additional base at Novorossiysk (Krasnodar Krai); public reporting since 2022 indicates redistributions of ships between these ports due to strike risks. In the Pacific Fleet, surface combatants are based around Vladivostok and Fokino, with major shipbuilding and repair capacity at the Zvezda complex (Primorsky Krai) and the Amur shipyard (Komsomolsk-on-Amur). These sites handle maintenance, refits, and new construction across classes from corvettes to frigates and auxiliaries.
Black Sea Fleet Facilities and Strike Impacts
Sevastopol remains the principal Black Sea Fleet base, encompassing naval piers, repair docks, aviation facilities, and command infrastructure; Novorossiysk functions as a secondary hub. Publicly documented strikes since 2022 include severe damage to the cruiser Moskva (which sank on 14 April 2022), the amphibious ship Saratov destroyed at Berdyansk on 24 March 2022, significant damage at Sevastopol’s dry dock on 13 September 2023 to the submarine Rostov-on-Don and landing ship Minsk, and a strike on the fleet headquarters building on 22 September 2023. Additional attacks in 2023–2024 affected Belbek airfield and other Crimea-based sites. Open sources indicate the fleet has dispersed assets and increased reliance on Novorossiysk amid ongoing risks.
Baltic Fleet and Kaliningrad Area Military Sites
The Baltic Fleet’s primary base is Baltiysk, with supporting facilities across Kaliningrad Oblast. Kaliningrad hosts layered air and coastal defense assets, including S-300/400 and Bastion systems, and army formations for enclave defense. The Yantar shipyard supports new construction and refits, including corvettes and auxiliaries. The region’s geography enables rapid access to the Baltic Sea but also imposes supply reliance on sea and air corridors independent of the main Russian landmass.
Caspian Flotilla Infrastructure
The Caspian Flotilla has modernized its basing at Kaspiysk (Republic of Dagestan) with expanded piers and support facilities, while Astrakhan remains an important logistics and administrative node. Flotilla assets include Buyan-M class missile ships capable of Kalibr land-attack missions, which have been used in regional operations. Infrastructure upgrades in Kaspiysk since the late 2010s have aimed to accommodate larger vessels and improve all-weather basing.
Air and Missile Defense Architecture
Russia fields multi-layered air and missile defenses around key population centers, military districts, and strategic sites. The S-400 system is widely deployed, with S-300 variants and Pantsir-S complementing coverage. The S-350 Vityaz has entered service in limited numbers, and the S-500 is reported to have initial units delivered, though publicly available details on deployment locations remain limited. Moscow is protected by a dedicated anti-ballistic missile system (A-135), centered on the Don-2N radar near Sofrino with 53T6 interceptors; the legacy 51T6 was retired in 2006. The A-235 Nudol program is reported as the modernization path, with testing activity publicly documented, including an anti-satellite test on 15 November 2021.
Early Warning Radars and Space Surveillance
Russia’s ballistic missile early warning network comprises Voronezh-series radars deployed at multiple sites, including Kaliningrad (Pionersky), Leningrad Oblast (Lekhtusi), Krasnodar Krai (Armavir), Orenburg Oblast (near Orsk), Krasnoyarsk Krai (Yeniseysk), and Irkutsk Oblast (Mishelevka), among others. Legacy Dnepr and Daryal sites at Olenegorsk (Murmansk Oblast) and Pechora (Komi Republic) have provided long-standing coverage. Space surveillance assets include the Okno optical complex in Tajikistan and the Krona system in the North Caucasus, supporting space domain awareness. The Titov Main Test and Space Systems Control Center in Krasnoznamensk (Moscow Oblast) is publicly identified as a core command-and-control node for space operations.
Space Launch and Missile Test Ranges
Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk Oblast) supports military space launches and ICBM test activities. Vostochny Cosmodrome (Amur Oblast) is Russia’s newer spaceport intended to reduce reliance on Baikonur (Kazakhstan), with steadily expanding infrastructure. Kapustin Yar (Astrakhan Oblast) is a primary range for missile and air-defense testing, while Sary-Shagan (Kazakhstan) is used for anti-ballistic missile trials under bilateral arrangements. The Nyonoksa naval test range near Severodvinsk is associated with sea-based missile trials; a 8 August 2019 accident related to a test recovery operation resulted in fatalities and a brief radiation release, as acknowledged by Russian authorities. Specific test schedules and detailed range instrumentation are not publicly disclosed.
Ground Forces Garrison Clusters and Training Areas
Major ground forces garrisons are distributed across each military district with concentrations near strategic axes. The Western theater features clusters around Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, and Voronezh, while the Southern theater emphasizes Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai. Large training areas include Mulino (Nizhny Novgorod Oblast), Pogonovo (Voronezh Oblast), Prudboy (Volgograd Oblast), Ashuluk (Astrakhan Oblast; also a SAM training range), Alabino (Moscow Oblast), and Chebarkul (Chelyabinsk Oblast). Unit dispositions have fluctuated since 2022 due to operational deployments; precise, current order-of-battle data at the site level is not officially released.
Arctic Military Infrastructure
Russia has expanded Arctic basing to strengthen domain awareness and protect the Northern Sea Route. Notable sites include Nagurskoye Airfield on Franz Josef Land with the Arctic Trefoil complex, Temp Airfield on Kotelny Island (New Siberian Islands) associated with the Northern Clover complex, and Rogachevo on Novaya Zemlya. These outposts support air operations, air defense deployments, and logistics in severe-weather conditions. Infrastructure development in the Arctic includes hardened shelters, fuel storage, and radar coverage to extend detection and response in high latitudes.
Occupied Crimea Military Infrastructure
Since 2014, Russia has developed extensive military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, including major naval facilities at Sevastopol, air bases such as Belbek and Saki, air-defense positions, coastal defense systems, and logistics hubs at Dzhankoy and Feodosia. Public reporting documents multiple attacks since 2022 that have damaged aircraft, ships, air-defense systems, and command facilities. Despite repeated strikes, the peninsula continues to host layered air defense, naval logistics, and aviation assets supporting operations in the Black Sea region.
Nuclear Weapons Storage and Handling (12th GUMO)
Russia’s 12th Main Directorate (12 GUMO) manages nuclear warhead storage, transport, and maintenance across a national network of central and regional facilities. Open sources list multiple sites dispersed across the country; however, exact locations, capacities, and security arrangements are classified and not publicly confirmed. Routine activities include warhead custody, scheduled maintenance, and support for strategic forces, non-strategic naval and air systems, and dual-capable missile units. Public data on specific storage sites should be treated cautiously due to the sensitivity of this mission.
Defense-Industrial and Repair Facilities Supporting Sites
Core defense-industrial nodes underpin basing and sustainment. Sevmash (Severodvinsk) constructs Borei-class SSBNs and Yasen-class SSNs, while Zvezdochka handles refits and overhauls. Yantar (Kaliningrad) builds and repairs surface combatants; the Zaliv yard in Kerch has undertaken large landing ship and amphibious assault ship construction. Uralvagonzavod (Nizhny Tagil) produces and refurbishes tanks; Votkinsk Machine Building Plant (Udmurtia) manufactures solid-fuel missiles such as Yars and Iskander; aircraft production and overhaul occur at KAPO (Kazan; Tu‑160M), Komsomolsk-on-Amur (Su‑35/Su‑57), Irkutsk (Su‑30SM/Yak‑130), and other UAC facilities. These sites interface with operational bases through supply chains for spares, engines, munitions, and refurbishment cycles.
Electronic Warfare, Communications, and SIGINT Nodes
Electronic warfare brigades and regiments are distributed across military districts, fielding systems such as Krasukha and Murmansk-BN for tactical to theater-level effects. Strategic communications and space command-and-control are centered around facilities in the Moscow region, notably Krasnoznamensk. Additional long-range communications and receiving sites are positioned to support submarine and bomber operations in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Specific site configurations, frequency plans, and real-time deployments are sensitive and not publicly disclosed in detail.
Documented Attack and Damage Patterns (2022–2024)
Open-source reporting since 2022 records repeated strikes against Russian military sites. Notable events include explosions and documented aircraft losses at Saki Air Base (9 August 2022), drone strikes on Engels and Dyagilevo air bases (December 2022, with subsequent attacks in 2023–2024), the sinking of the cruiser Moskva (14 April 2022), the destruction of the landing ship Saratov at Berdyansk (24 March 2022), the damage to submarine Rostov-on-Don and landing ship Minsk at Sevastopol’s dry dock (13 September 2023), a strike on the Black Sea Fleet headquarters (22 September 2023), the destruction of the landing ship Novocherkassk at Feodosia (26 December 2023), and multiple attacks on Belbek airfield and other sites in Crimea and Russia’s border regions. These incidents prompted dispersal, increased air defense coverage, camouflage, and the use of decoy assets, as observed in publicly available imagery and reports.
Legal and Transparency Context Affecting Site Visibility
International arms control and transparency regimes influence public insight into some Russian military sites. Russia withdrew from the Treaty on Open Skies (2021) and suspended its participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, reducing routine transparency. New START remained the primary bilateral framework for strategic nuclear forces data exchanges, though Russia announced suspension of its participation in 2023; limited public data and periodic statements still inform approximate force levels and basing types. The Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures provides for some notifications and inspections, but reporting has been affected by the broader security environment. Consequently, many site-specific details are not officially released.
Security and Hardening Measures
Russia employs physical security, redundancy, and hardening across high-value military sites. Silo fields and strategic command locations are protected by layered perimeter security and air defenses; mobile missile units exploit dispersal and deception. Historically reported hardened command facilities in the Ural region, including complexes such as those associated with Yamantau and Kosvinsky, are frequently cited in open sources, though official details remain limited. Naval bases and airfields have expanded the use of aircraft and ship shelters, decoys, and netting; critical infrastructure is supported by auxiliary sites to improve survivability and continuity of operations under attack conditions.