The input identifies an entity labeled 'FSO Operational Department, military unit 38995' and names 'Sergey Kudinov' as its commander. The same line is provided twice, indicating a single data point duplicated rather than two distinct entries.
There is insufficient authoritative open-source documentation to confirm the existence of an FSO unit publicly designated as 'military unit 38995' or to verify the assignment of a commander named Sergey Kudinov to that unit as of October 2024. The Federal Protective Service (FSO) generally does not disclose internal unit numbers (voinskaya chast, v/ch) or mid-level command appointments in public records. In the absence of corroboration from official decrees, court records, state procurement disclosures, or recognized media, this designation remains unverified.
The FSO is a federal executive body responsible for state protection of senior officials and designated government facilities, as well as for secure government communications. It is the institutional successor to the Soviet KGB’s Ninth Directorate via the Main Guard Directorate (GUO). The FSO’s mission set includes close protection, site security, event security, convoy and route security, counter-surveillance, technical security, and secure communications for top state bodies.
The FSO operates under the Federal Law of the Russian Federation 'On State Protection' (No. 57-FZ, 27 May 1996) and subsequent presidential decrees and government regulations that define protected persons, protected facilities, security measures, and the service’s rights to use force and special equipment. In 2003, following the dissolution of FAPSI, the Service of Special Communications and Information (Spetssvyaz) was established within the FSO to manage secure government communications and information protection.
Publicly acknowledged FSO components include the Presidential Security Service (a protective directorate), the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin with the Presidential (Kremlin) Regiment for guard and ceremonial duties, and Spetssvyaz for secure communications. Detailed internal directorates and unit numbering are not published. An 'operational department' in such a service typically coordinates protective missions, advance teams, technical security measures, and rapid-response elements, but the FSO does not release official organograms that would link these functions to specific numbered units.
Dmitry V. Kochnev has served as Director of the FSO since May 2016, succeeding Evgeny A. Murov. The FSO does not routinely disclose the identities of subordinate unit commanders. There is no authoritative public confirmation that an individual named Sergey Kudinov commands a unit designated 'military unit 38995' within the FSO.
The FSO’s core functions documented in open sources include close protection of designated officials, protection of key state facilities, coordination of motorcades, security screening and access control at protected sites, counter-sniper and overwatch during high-profile events, explosive ordnance screening and canine support, technical inspections against eavesdropping and improvised devices, and the provision of encrypted communications and secure information systems for the top leadership and state bodies.
Protected sites publicly linked to FSO responsibilities include the Moscow Kremlin complex, the presidential residence at Novo-Ogaryovo (Moscow Oblast), and the Bocharov Ruchey residence in Sochi. State media and official communications also reference protection of venues hosting federal-level events and meetings. Additional residences used by top officials are reported in media; however, detailed security arrangements, internal layouts, and specific unit assignments for these sites are not publicly disclosed.
Open sources indicate the FSO employs layered physical security at protected facilities (perimeters, controlled entry points, surveillance, and screening systems) and integrates secure communications provided by Spetssvyaz across fixed, mobile, and satellite channels. The service coordinates with transportation, medical, and technical support elements to sustain continuous protection during movements and events. Specific inventories, network architectures, and deployment patterns are classified.
Public imagery and official footage show that the presidential motorcade includes domestically produced armored vehicles from the Aurus 'Kortezh' program (Aurus Senat) and support vehicles. Protective personnel are observed using modern protective gear and communications equipment appropriate to close protection duties. Specific weapon models, electronic countermeasures, and vehicle armor specifications assigned to FSO units are not officially disclosed.
FSO protective operations are conducted in coordination with other state bodies. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) provides traffic management and area policing during motorcades and events; federal and regional authorities facilitate road closures and venue security perimeters; counterintelligence support and threat information are coordinated with security and intelligence services; and airspace and air defense considerations involve competent military and civil aviation authorities. Detailed tasking arrangements are not made public.
Publicly observable measures include credentialing and access control, screening of persons and cargo, surveillance coverage, establishment of restricted zones, route sanitation for movements, and visible and concealed protective posts. Technical security measures, including counter-surveillance sweeps and communications security, are standard practice in state protection but are not described in official detail for operational security reasons.
The Presidential (Kremlin) Regiment, subordinated to the FSO Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin, performs guard duties within the Kremlin and ceremonial functions including the Changing of the Guard. While publicly visible and frequently covered by state media, its internal structure, strength, and equipment allocations beyond ceremonial use are not officially detailed.
The FSO’s budgetary details and procurement are largely classified. When procurement information appears in public registers, it usually avoids explicit identification of sensitive unit numbers or operational capabilities. Open-source procurement data are therefore of limited utility for mapping FSO internal unit designations to specific locations or commanders.
Given the absence of corroboration in authoritative public records, the pairing of 'FSO Operational Department' with 'military unit 38995' and a commander named 'Sergey Kudinov' cannot be validated. Russian 'military unit' postal numbers are used across multiple ministries and agencies and may change over time; without official documentation, inferring an FSO affiliation for v/ch 38995 would be unreliable.
Unresolved points include: the existence and current assignment of v/ch 38995; the full official name of any FSO department associated with that number; and the identity and role of Sergey Kudinov in the FSO, if any. Corroboration, if possible, would typically require cross-checking Russian official publications, court rulings that mention unit postal numbers, archived state procurement notices, and reports from recognized Russian media outlets. If such documentation is unavailable, the details should be treated as non-public or classified.