The designation "Counterintelligence Operations Department" and the attribution "Commander: Lieutenant General Dmitriy Minayev" were provided as input. As of October 2024, open-source records do not conclusively identify a Russian state security or defense body by that exact English title, nor confirm the named officer in that billet. In the Russian system, military counterintelligence is executed by the Federal Security Service (FSB) through its military counterintelligence structures. The analysis below summarizes publicly documented sites, infrastructure, and authorities that support Russian military counterintelligence. Where specific locations or positions are not publicly disclosed, this is explicitly noted.
Military counterintelligence in Russia is an FSB responsibility under Federal Law No. 40-FZ "On the Federal Security Service" (3 April 1995) and Federal Law No. 144-FZ "On Operative-Search Activity" (12 August 1995), with the protection of state secrets governed by the Law of the Russian Federation No. 5485-1 "On State Secrets" (21 July 1993). The function inherits from the KGB’s 3rd Chief Directorate. FSB military counterintelligence covers the Armed Forces, other militarized formations (e.g., the National Guard/Rosgvardia), and defense enterprises handling classified work. Core tasks include detection and suppression of espionage and sabotage, protection of state secrets, personnel vetting and clearances, counterintelligence briefings and debriefings, and investigative support for state treason (Criminal Code Art. 275), espionage (Art. 276), and disclosure of state secrets (Art. 283).
FSB central headquarters is located at Lubyanka Square in Moscow (Bolshaya Lubyanka), a complex that includes adjacent administrative buildings such as those on Kuznetsky Most. Oversight of military counterintelligence is exercised from within this central apparatus. While the HQ’s role is widely documented, the precise internal placement, numbering, and office designations of military counterintelligence directorates are not publicly detailed. Central tasking, policy, and coordination for regional bodies and embedded military elements originate from this headquarters.
Counterintelligence cases involving treason and espionage frequently involve the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center in Moscow, historically tied to state security investigations. The facility is administered by the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN), with FSB investigative bodies utilizing it for relevant cases. Operational procedures, internal layouts, and capacity specifics of detention and interrogation facilities are not publicly disclosed.
The FSB maintains territorial bodies (UFSB) in every federal subject. Military counterintelligence elements are present at and alongside the headquarters of Russia’s military districts and major commands. As of 2023–2024, Russia announced the re-establishment of the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, complementing the Southern (Rostov-on-Don), Central (Yekaterinburg), Eastern (Khabarovsk), and the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (Severomorsk). District-level military counterintelligence directorates coordinate counterintelligence tasks for field armies, air and air-defense armies, and fleets within their areas of responsibility. Specific office locations and internal structures at district HQs are not public.
Embedded military counterintelligence offices are present with combined-arms armies, divisions and brigades, airbases, missile units, naval bases, and major depots. Naval coverage extends to the Northern, Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets, as well as the Caspian Flotilla. Typical functions at these sites include threat briefings and debriefings (e.g., pre- and post-deployment), clearance and access control for work with state secrets, protective security surveys, liaison with unit commanders on insider-threat mitigation, and support to criminal inquiries when indicators of espionage, sabotage, or unlawful disclosure arise. Exact manning, locations within garrisons, and procedural details are not publicly released.
FSB military counterintelligence coverage extends to defense-industrial enterprises and research institutes handling classified programs, pursuant to state secrecy regulations. This typically includes design bureaus and production plants in shipbuilding (e.g., St. Petersburg and Severodvinsk clusters), aerospace and avionics (e.g., Kazan, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Novosibirsk), armored vehicle production (e.g., Nizhny Tagil), precision weapons and small arms (e.g., Tula, Izhevsk), and air-defense systems (including sites affiliated with the Almaz-Antey concern). The presence, staffing, and precise locations of FSB counterintelligence offices within specific enterprises are not officially disclosed.
Training for FSB counterintelligence officers is centered on the FSB Academy in Moscow, with publicly referenced subordinate institutes, including a campus in Oryol. Instruction covers legal frameworks, operative-search methods, counterespionage tradecraft, and protection of state secrets. Detailed curricula, training throughput, staff rosters, and facility layouts are not public. Military counterintelligence personnel also undertake in-service courses at regional training centers to maintain operational readiness.
Counterintelligence sites are characterized by controlled perimeters, layered access control, identity verification, secure storage for classified materials, interview and processing rooms, and dedicated secure communications. Embedded military offices coordinate with unit security officers and, where applicable, military police, to enforce protection-of-secrets measures and manage incident response. Technical specifications of communications systems, cryptographic equipment, alarm systems, and building hardening are restricted information and not published in open sources.
Since 2022, public reporting indicates heightened protective measures at military installations and defense enterprises, including the introduction of elevated regional "response levels" and a broader emphasis on countersabotage protection. Open sources have described tightened access control at sensitive sites and an increased tempo of FSB investigations into treason, espionage, and sabotage cases. These trends imply intensified counterintelligence activity at district headquarters, garrisons, and industrial plants, though quantitative metrics and internal directives remain undisclosed.
Open sources do not substantiate the assignment of a "Commander: Lieutenant General Dmitriy Minayev" to a body titled "Counterintelligence Operations Department." Official Russian publications do not, as a rule, reveal detailed command rosters or the internal department-level structure of the FSB’s military counterintelligence. The exact distribution of counterintelligence offices across specific military installations, their internal layouts, staffing levels, budget allocations, and communications architecture is classified or otherwise withheld from public release. As such, this assessment confines itself to publicly documented structures, authorities, and site typologies.