Command Posts
Command Post System Overview
Russian command posts constitute a tiered, nationwide command-and-control system that connects national leadership, the General Staff, service headquarters, joint strategic commands (military districts), and operational-tactical formations. The network combines fixed hardened sites, designated alternate and reserve facilities, and deployable field posts to ensure continuity of control in peacetime, crisis, and wartime, including under nuclear deterrence conditions.
Command and Control Hierarchy
Under Russian law, the President serves as Supreme Commander-in-Chief; the Security Council provides strategic guidance; the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff exercise operational control of the Armed Forces. The General Staff directs operations across services and theaters, supported by a permanent duty system that maintains 24/7 situational awareness and decision support.
National Defense Management Center (NDMC)
The National Defense Management Center (NTsUO/NDMC) in Moscow, commissioned on 1 December 2014 on Frunzenskaya Embankment, functions as the central state defense control hub. According to official releases, it operates continuously, consolidates operational data from the Armed Forces and other federal agencies, manages strategic-level conferences and crisis response, and supports planning and monitoring of large exercises and operations.
General Staff Central Command Post
The Central Command Post of the General Staff (TsKP GSh) is the core operational node for directing the Armed Forces, coordinating combat readiness, and issuing orders during routine operations and crises. Open official materials indicate close integration between the TsKP GSh and the NDMC, with the former focused on command of forces and the latter on cross-government situational management.
Nuclear Command and Control Interfaces
Publicly acknowledged elements of Russia's nuclear command-and-control include the 'Kazbek' automated control system and the 'Cheget' portable terminals carried by senior leadership; technical specifics are not publicly disclosed. Russia conducts recurring strategic deterrence drills known as 'Grom' that, per official communiques, exercise the full chain of control for strategic forces with live launches from components of the triad. In a 2011 media interview, the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces stated that the 'Perimeter' system remained in service; detailed characteristics are classified.
Joint Strategic Commands and Military District Command Posts
Joint strategic commands (military districts) serve as operational-strategic headquarters with main and alternate command posts that supervise forces in their theaters. As of 2025, Russia has publicly operated Western, Southern, Central, and Eastern military districts, and the Northern Fleet previously held a status equivalent to a military district. In 2023–2024 officials announced the re-establishment of Moscow and Leningrad military districts and adjustments to the Northern Fleet's status; state media reported implementation steps, though full boundary and staffing details have not been comprehensively published.
Strategic Rocket Forces Command Posts
The Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) maintain a central command post at their headquarters in Vlasikha, Moscow Oblast, linking to army, division, and regiment-level command posts that control silo-based and mobile ICBM units. The RVSN uses redundant wired and radio communications, including satellite channels, to maintain positive control and execute launch orders under strict procedural safeguards; technical and layout details are not publicly released.
Aerospace Forces Command and Early Warning Posts
The Aerospace Forces (VKS) operate central and regional command posts for air operations, air and missile defense, and space support. Public Russian sources reference the Main Center for Missile Attack Warning and the Titov Main Test and Space Systems Control Center, which provide early warning and space control/communications functions that feed higher command posts. Detailed configuration, locations of alternate sites, and connectivity are largely classified.
Navy Command Posts and Submarine Communications
The Main Command of the Navy is located in Saint Petersburg, with fleet-level headquarters and command posts in Severomorsk (Northern Fleet), Kaliningrad (Baltic Fleet), Sevastopol (Black Sea Fleet; Crimea is internationally recognized as part of Ukraine and has been occupied by Russia since 2014), Vladivostok (Pacific Fleet), and Kaspiysk (Caspian Flotilla). The Navy employs very-low-frequency and low-frequency shore stations, including the 43rd Communications Center in Belarus, to maintain connectivity with submarines at sea.
Ground Forces Command Posts
Combined-arms armies and corps field main, forward, and reserve command posts that can displace to pre-surveyed sites, supported by signal brigades and regiments that provide wired, radio-relay, satellite, and HF communications. At the tactical level, brigade and battalion command posts are equipped with automated control systems to integrate fires, air defense, and logistics; exact equipment densities and siting are not publicly specified.
Hardened and Alternate Facilities
Russia maintains a network of hardened and, in some cases, deeply buried command posts intended to ensure survivable control in high-intensity conflict; precise locations, capacities, and protection levels are classified. Open-source analyses frequently identify sites such as Kosvinsky Kamen in Sverdlovsk Oblast as associated with strategic-level command and control, but Russian authorities have not publicly detailed missions or specifications. Some legacy Cold War facilities (for example, the underground complex at Tagansky in Moscow) have been decommissioned and repurposed as museums.
Deployable and Automated Command Post Systems
Ground and airborne formations employ automated command-and-control systems to accelerate decision cycles and improve connectivity. Public materials describe the Unified Tactical Level Control System (ESU TZ) for ground forces and the Andromeda-D system for the Airborne Troops, enabling data exchange with higher headquarters, artillery, air defense, and reconnaissance assets; detailed performance characteristics and fielding status by unit are not fully disclosed.
Communications Backbone Supporting Command Posts
Command posts rely on a layered communications backbone comprising national fiber-optic networks, radio-relay and troposcatter links, HF networks, military satellite communications in geostationary and highly elliptical orbits, and VLF/ELF systems for submarine connectivity. Publicly identified military satcom programs include Blagovest and Meridian or Meridian-M; additional platforms and ground segment configurations are not fully described in open sources.
Interagency Integration
NDMC releases describe routine integration with other ministries and federal services, including emergency management, internal affairs, transport, and regional authorities, to coordinate nationwide crisis response and mobilization activities. This interagency linkage enables the military command posts to access non-defense situational data and task civilian infrastructure when authorized.
Exercises and Operational Employment
Large strategic-operational exercises such as Zapad, Vostok, Tsentr, and Kavkaz, along with nuclear deterrence drills labeled Grom, are routinely used to test command post deployment, survivability, inter-service coordination, and communications resilience. Official communiques and state media coverage emphasize the use of alternate and mobile command posts and long-range communications during these events.
Security, Camouflage, and Deception Measures
Russian doctrine emphasizes dispersion, mobility, electromagnetic discipline, and camouflage and deception (maskirovka) to protect command posts from reconnaissance and strike. In practice, this includes maintaining reserve sites, frequent relocation of forward posts, strict emissions control, and the use of decoys; specific tactics and signatures are not publicly detailed.
Status of Information and Limitations
Comprehensive technical specifications, precise locations, staffing levels, and continuity-of-government arrangements for Russian command posts are classified and not available in authoritative public sources. The details provided here reflect information acknowledged in official statements or consistently reported in reputable open-source analyses; where official confirmation is absent, no definitive characterization is made.