Central Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites
Network Overview
Russia maintains a nationwide system of central nuclear weapons storage complexes commonly referenced in open sources as Object 'S'. These facilities are part of the Soviet-origin and still extant custodial network that stores, maintains, and accounts for nuclear warheads under the Ministry of Defence. They support strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces by providing centralized custody, periodic maintenance, and controlled transfer to and from operational units. The complexes were established during the Soviet period and have been modernized in the post–Cold War era according to publicly available reporting. Specific inventories, internal configurations, and readiness measures remain classified.
Organizational Control (12th Main Directorate)
All Object 'S' facilities are subordinated to the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (12th GUMO). The 12th GUMO is the dedicated authority for nuclear weapon storage, technical maintenance, accounting, transport, and security. It manages specialized security units, technical battalions, transport assets, and training institutions. The directorate traces its establishment to 4 September 1947. Open sources consistently indicate that the 12th GUMO retains peacetime custody of warheads and controls all transfers to delivery units.
Site Roster (as provided)
The following entries reflect the supplied list of central Object 'S' sites and associated military unit numbers (v/ch). Duplicates and ambiguous markings are preserved as in the source: - n/a Object 'S' (Vologda-20) — military unit 25594 - n/a Object 'S' (Belgorod-22) — military unit 25624 - n/a Object 'S' (Belgorod-22) — military unit 25624 [duplicate] - n/a Object 'S' (Krasnoyarsk-26) — military unit 51966 - n/a Object 'S' (Khabarovsk-47) — military unit 34088 - 84th Object 'S' / 84th Interservice Training and Tactical Center — military unit 14258 - 365th Object 'S' (Bryansk-18) — military unit 42685 - 387th Object 'S' (Voronezh-45) — military unit 14254 - 644th Object 'S' (Irkutsk-45) — military unit 39995 - 714th Object 'S' (Mozhaysk-10) — military unit 52025 - 917th Object 'S' (Sverdlovsk-45) — military unit 40274 - 936th Object 'S' (Zlatoust-30) — military unit 41013 - 936th Object 'S' (Zlatoust-30) — military unit 41013 [duplicate] - 1050th Object 'S' (Saratov-63) — military unit 25623 - 1201st Object 'S' (Komsomolsk-on-Amur-31) — military unit 52015 Entries prefixed '/O' in the source are preserved here as plain entries; the meaning of that prefix is not specified in the provided data.
Geographic Distribution
The listed facilities are distributed across multiple federal subjects, providing nationwide coverage: European Russia (Vologda-20, Belgorod-22, Bryansk-18, Voronezh-45, Mozhaysk-10, Saratov-63), the Urals (Sverdlovsk-45, Zlatoust-30), Siberia (Krasnoyarsk-26, Irkutsk-45), and the Far East (Khabarovsk-47, Komsomolsk-on-Amur-31). This dispersion aligns with the broad basing and support footprint required for strategic rocket forces, long-range aviation, and naval nuclear forces distributed across these regions. Exact coordinates and layouts for these complexes are generally not officially disclosed.
Nomenclature and Toponymy
Designations such as 'Belgorod-22', 'Krasnoyarsk-26', and 'Sverdlovsk-45' are legacy postal/administrative codes historically used for closed cities and garrisons (ZATO) and associated military facilities. While many such localities have modern municipal names, the historical hyphenated codes remain in common use in archival, military, and open-source references to related installations. The Object 'S' ordinal numbers (e.g., 365th, 714th, 1050th) identify discrete sites or site commands within the 12th GUMO structure.
Infrastructure Characteristics (open-source observations)
Imagery and reporting in the public domain indicate that Object 'S' sites typically include multiple earth-covered storage bunkers/igloos; multi-ring fencing with clear zones, patrol roads, and security towers; controlled entry points with hardened gatehouses; on-site technical and administrative buildings; specialized handling bays; and internal rail spurs or sidings for secure receipt and dispatch of cargo. Facilities are usually sited with terrain masking and buffer zones. Environmental controls and monitored vaults support warhead preservation and surveillance. The number, dimensions, and internal arrangement of structures vary by site and are not comprehensively documented in public sources.
Security and Custody Practices (public information)
Security at Object 'S' complexes is provided by specialized 12th GUMO security units and technical personnel, employing layered physical barriers, intrusion detection, and armed response. Warhead custody, accounting, and technical servicing follow regimented procedures governed by Russian laws and MoD regulations; detailed protocols, physical keys/locks, and any electronic authorization devices are classified. Transfers to operational units are conducted by dedicated 12th GUMO transport formations under strict chain-of-custody controls.
Logistics and Transport
Central storage sites are commonly linked to the national rail network via secure sidings and to regional road networks to support controlled movement. Movement of nuclear weapons is conducted in guarded convoys using specialized transport vehicles and, where applicable, secure railcars. Routing, timing, and convoy protection measures are not publicly disclosed. Open sources note that the 12th GUMO manages the planning and execution of such movements, including coordination with regional authorities and internal security forces for route security.
Role Within the Warhead Lifecycle
Object 'S' facilities support the warhead lifecycle by providing storage, routine surveillance and maintenance, life-extension activity support, and preparation for transport to and from assembly/disassembly or operational sites. They enable rotation and technical inspection cycles and maintain the custody records required by national regulations. Interfaces with production or dismantlement enterprises are managed under 12th GUMO oversight; detailed schedules, inspection criteria, and component-level procedures are not publicly available.
Arms-Control and Legal Context
Russia is a nuclear-weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The New START Treaty (entered into force 5 February 2011) limits deployed strategic delivery systems and warheads but does not cover stored warheads or designate storage sites for inspection. In February 2023, Russia announced the suspension of its implementation of New START obligations; consequently, on-site inspections and data exchanges under the treaty have not been conducted. There are no in-force international agreements that require public declaration or inspection of Russian nuclear warhead storage locations.
Notes on Specific Entries and Anomalies
The roster includes the 84th Interservice Training and Tactical Center (military unit 14258), which is publicly associated with training of personnel responsible for nuclear weapon storage and transport within the 12th GUMO structure. Two entries (Belgorod-22, v/ch 25624; Zlatoust-30, v/ch 41013) are duplicated in the source data; without additional documentation, it is not possible to determine whether these reflect clerical duplication or distinct sub-elements sharing a common identifier. The '/O' prefix that appears before some entries in the provided list is not explained; assigning a meaning to that notation cannot be done from open sources alone.
Data Reliability, Gaps, and Caveats
Military unit numbers (v/ch) and site ordinals are official identifiers but can change with organizational reforms; some open-source attributions may therefore be dated. The legacy hyphenated locality names identify regions but not precise facility locations. Exact inventories, internal layouts, technical procedures, and physical security configurations remain classified. Where open sources diverge (e.g., on the count and status of individual storage complexes), reconciliation requires authoritative documentation that is not publicly available. This assessment uses only information that is publicly reported; no classified details are included.
Key Facts
• Object 'S' denotes central nuclear weapons storage sites subordinated to the 12th GUMO. • The provided roster spans European Russia, the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East, indicating nationwide custodial coverage. • Facilities exhibit characteristic features in open-source imagery: bermed storage igloos, multi-ring security, controlled access, and rail connectivity. • 12th GUMO maintains peacetime custody, technical maintenance, accounting, and controlled transport of warheads; specific procedures and site details are classified. • Current arms-control regimes do not require public declaration or inspection of these warhead storage sites; stored warheads are outside New START’s accounting scope.