Baltiysk Naval Base is located at Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia (approximately 54.65N, 19.91E), astride the Baltiysk Strait that links the Vistula Lagoon (Kaliningrad Bay) to the Baltic Sea. It is the principal seaward base of the Russian Baltic Fleet and provides direct access to international waters without transit through foreign straits. The base sits close to NATO territory (Poland and Lithuania), placing it at the center of a heavily monitored and contested maritime space in the southeastern Baltic.
The base hosts the headquarters at Baltiysk and is home to the 71st Landing Ship Brigade and the 128th Surface Ship Brigade of the Baltic Fleet. The 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade is garrisoned in the Baltiysk area and routinely trains for amphibious operations in coordination with the landing forces. These formations collectively provide the Baltic Fleet with amphibious lift, littoral assault capability, surface combatants for escort and patrol, and an organic marine force for coastal and expeditionary tasks.
The brigade’s large landing ships (Project 775/Ropucha-class) include BDK-43 Minsk (127), BDK-58 Kaliningrad (102), BDK-61 Korolev (130), and BDK-100 Aleksandr Shabalin (110). Typical Project 775 characteristics are about 4,000+ tons full load, around 112 m length, approximately 500 tons cargo, capacity for about 10 main battle tanks (or comparable vehicles) and 300–340 troops, and a maximum speed around 17–18 knots. High-speed air-cushion assets consist of Project 12322 Zubr-class LCAC Yevgeny Kocheshkov (770) and Mordovia (782), among the world’s largest hovercraft, generally capable of carrying up to three MBTs or about 10 armored vehicles plus troops at 50+ knots over water and beaches. Additional fast shallow-water lift is provided by Project 21820 Dyugon-class landing craft Denis Davydov (748), Leytenant Rimsky-Korsakov (754), and Michman Lermontov (757), optimized for rapid littoral transport (typical payload two MBTs or four APCs, high 30+ knot speeds). The brigade also operates smaller landing craft Project 11770 Serna (D-67 767, D-1441 Kontr-admiral Demidov 791, D-1442 Kontr-admiral Olenin 792) and Project 1176 (D-465 746) for beach insertion of a tank or equivalent cargo, as well as Project 1388 torpedo retrievers TL-1603, TL-1668, and TL-923 used to recover exercise torpedoes and support range activities.
In January–February 2022, the brigade’s three Ropucha-class large landing ships Minsk, Kaliningrad, and Korolev transited from the Baltic through the North Sea and Mediterranean into the Black Sea. On 13 September 2023, BDK-43 Minsk was struck while in dry dock at Sevastopol; the UK Ministry of Defence publicly assessed it likely functionally destroyed based on observed damage imagery. Public sources have reported continued use of Baltic Fleet landing ships for logistics shuttles in the Black Sea theater and wider region since early 2022, though real-time locations and readiness states are not publicly disclosed.
The brigade includes legacy Project 956A Sovremenny-class destroyers and modern frigates and corvettes. Bespokoyny (620) was withdrawn from active service in 2018 and converted into a museum exhibit in Kronstadt, and thus is not an operational combatant; Nastoychivy (610), historically the Baltic Fleet flagship, has spent extended periods under overhaul or out of service in recent years with no publicly reported sea deployments for a prolonged period. The two Project 11540 Yastreb (Neustrashimy-class) frigates Neustrashimy (712) and Yaroslav Mudry (727) are general-purpose escorts with an emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, helicopter operations (Ka-27 family), medium-caliber naval gunfire, and point to medium-range air defense. Modern surface combat capability is centered on four Project 20380 Steregushchiy-class corvettes Steregushchiy (530), Soobrazitelny (531), Boikiy (532), and Stoikiy (545), typically equipped with a 100 mm A-190 gun, Uran (Kh-35) anti-ship missiles, Redut vertical-launch surface-to-air missiles on most units, Paket-NK anti-torpedo/ASW system, and a flight deck and hangar for a Ka-27 series helicopter.
Baltiysk provides multiple naval piers, mooring basins, and support services for amphibious and surface combatants, as well as ordnance handling, fueling, and routine maintenance. Ship Repair Plant No. 33 (SRZ-33) at Baltiysk is publicly identified as a Baltic Fleet repair facility for afloat maintenance and docking of small to medium-displacement vessels, while major overhauls and complex modernizations are typically undertaken at larger shipyards in the region such as Yantar in Kaliningrad. The base’s infrastructure supports hovercraft operations, small craft launch and recovery, and integration with the Kaliningrad Sea Canal for movements between Baltiysk and the city of Kaliningrad.
The base sits on the narrow Baltiysk Strait with breakwaters and a dredged approach channel. The Kaliningrad Sea Canal (approximately 40+ km in length) connects Baltiysk to Kaliningrad and is maintained to accommodate medium-draft naval and commercial traffic, including large landing ships, corvettes, and auxiliary vessels. Periodic dredging is required to counter shoaling typical of the area. Weather in the southeastern Baltic is generally manageable year-round for naval operations, though sea state, seasonal storms, and ice conditions in harsh winters can temporarily affect smaller craft and hovercraft availability.
Baltiysk’s surface and amphibious forces operate within the broader Kaliningrad defensive cluster that includes, per open reporting, coastal missile units (Bastion and Bal systems), layered air defense (including S-400 in the oblast), naval aviation operating from regional air bases such as Chkalovsk and Donskoye, and ground-based missile forces (including the 152nd Guards Missile Brigade with Iskander-M at Chernyakhovsk). This integrated posture provides coastal strike, air defense, and anti-access coverage over the southeastern Baltic Sea, supporting fleet operations from Baltiysk and complicating adversary freedom of action near the enclave.
As an exclave, Kaliningrad relies on maritime and air lines of communication for assured supply. Since 2022, Russia has emphasized the Ust-Luga–Baltiysk sea ferry corridor for civilian and military-relevant logistics to bypass overland transit restrictions, using roll-on/roll-off and railway ferries calling at the Baltiysk port complex. The naval base benefits from proximity to these maritime logistics routes, enabling fuel, ammunition, and spare parts flow, while heavy maintenance tasks are routed to regional shipyards. Specific stockpile quantities, storage locations, and movement schedules are not publicly released.
The base supports regular Baltic Fleet training and fleet readiness events, including amphibious drills that commonly use the Khmelevka coastal training range in Kaliningrad Oblast for naval infantry and landing craft. Surface combatants of the 128th Brigade conduct patrols, gunnery, anti-ship, and anti-submarine exercises within designated Baltic Sea ranges. Baltic Fleet units periodically participate in higher-profile Russian Navy exercises (for example, Ocean Shield iterations), with activity levels publicly reported through official releases and NOTAM/NAVWARN notices.
Publicly verifiable changes relevant to Baltiysk-based units include the decommissioning of destroyer Bespokoyny (620) in 2018 and its conversion to a museum exhibit at Kronstadt, and the September 2023 strike at Sevastopol that severely damaged the Baltic Fleet’s Ropucha-class landing ship Minsk (127). Additionally, multiple Baltic Fleet landing ships undertook long-distance movements to the Black Sea and Mediterranean in early 2022. Beyond such events, day-to-day readiness and operational status of individual hulls are not continuously disclosed.
Exact real-time vessel positions, detailed readiness levels, munitions holdings, pier security arrangements, and specific storage or command-and-control site locations are not publicly available and may be classified. The above composition, capabilities, and event references draw on open-source, verifiable reporting; where current-status details are not officially released, no assumptions are made.