This record is best understood as a distributed Russian Aerospace Forces / radio-technical radar network rather than a single base. The strongest direct open-source matches are the Sopka-2 site on Wrangel Island, which Russian reporting said entered service in 2016, and the Rezonans-NE complex at Indiga in Nenets Autonomous Okrug, visible in publicly discussed imagery dated January 30, 2026; public reporting also places related Rezonans-N sites at Cape Kanin/Shoina and Rogachevo on Novaya Zemlya. ([tass.com](https://tass.com/defense/1089239?utm_source=openai))
The equipment names associated with this record fit a layered surveillance architecture. Official Rosoboronexport material describes Nebo-SVU as a VHF radar for detection and tracking of modern low-signature targets; Rezonans-NE as a long-range VHF radar for all-altitude detection of stealth, ballistic and hypersonic targets; and Podlet-K1KE as an S-band low-altitude detector. Almaz-Antey/LEMZ describes Sopka-2 as a 3D air-route radar, including a transportable version intended to reuse older P-35/P-37 radar positions with minimal site preparation. ([roe.ru](https://roe.ru/en/production/protivovozdushnaya-oborona/sredstva-obnaruzheniya-vozdushnykh-tseley/radiolokatsionnye-stantsii-metrovogo-diapazona/nebo-svu/?redirect=Y&theme=theme-brown))
Russia publicly stated in 2015 and again in 2018-2019 that it was building out air-defense radar infrastructure on Wrangel Island, Sredniy Island and Cape Schmidt. Independent Arctic reporting says the first two Rezonans-N sites at Cape Kanin and Indiga were operating from 2017, with Rogachevo added in 2019 and additional Kola Peninsula sites later. That pattern matches an Arctic-oriented early-warning belt rather than isolated local radars. ([tass.com](https://tass.com/defense/842201?utm_source=openai))
As of December 14, 2020, the chief of Russia’s Radio-Technical Troops said Arctic and eastern sectors were on combat duty with Fundament-M automation and radars such as Nebo, Podlyot, Kasta-2-2 and Sopka. On January 6, 2025, Russia’s Defense Ministry said radio-technical troops had tracked more than two million aerial objects during 2024. Taken together, this record is most plausibly a map of sensor nodes feeding Russia’s wider air-defense picture, not a list of autonomous missile batteries. ([tass.com](https://tass.com/defense/1234725?utm_source=openai))
Open sources reviewed here verify the network concept and several specific Arctic nodes, but they do not provide equally direct confirmation for every placemark in the 21-point record or each site’s current equipment fit. Outside the best-documented Arctic examples, site-by-site status should therefore be treated as only partially verified; exact unit identities, readiness levels, and any recent removals are not publicly confirmed. This is an analytic judgment based on the source set reviewed. ([thebarentsobserver.com](https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/governors-touchdown-on-arctic-coast-gives-a-rare-glimpse-of-russian-military-radars/444453))