Designation: 677th Military Transport Aviation Command and Control Center; Russian: "677-й центр управления военно-транспортной авиации"; common abbreviation: 677 TsU VTA. Military unit number (v/ch): 93810. The same numeric identifier is referenced alongside the unit’s headquarters and its protected command post in open-source mentions. Official Russian Ministry of Defense publications do not provide a public address or geocoordinates for v/ch 93810.
The 677th Command and Control Center (v/ch 93810) is associated with Military Transport Aviation (VTA), a branch of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). In Russia’s command architecture, VTA is a service-level component responsible for strategic and operational airlift. A branch-level command-and-control center serves as the 24/7 operational node for planning, tasking, monitoring, and controlling VTA missions, and interfaces with higher echelons of the VKS and, as required, the National Defense Management Center for situational reporting and coordination. Specific internal wiring diagrams, staffing tables, and subordination chains for v/ch 93810 are not publicly released.
The center’s doctrinal role is to provide centralized planning and control of Military Transport Aviation operations. Core functions typically include: flight scheduling and route/slot allocation across the national and deployed airfield network; lift allocation and load planning in support of armed forces logistics, mobilization, and airdrop/air-landing operations; readiness monitoring of VTA aviation units; coordination with air traffic services within the Unified Air Traffic Management System of the Russian Federation (ЕС ОрВД) and with military ATC; management of special air-transport tasks (e.g., time-sensitive movements, medical evacuation, and support to other services). Public sources do not disclose operation-specific tasking attributed directly to v/ch 93810.
Open-source references differentiate between the unit headquarters of the 677th Command and Control Center and a Protected Command Post under the same military unit number (v/ch 93810). In Russian practice, a headquarters provides administrative and routine operational control, while a protected command post (ZKP, "защищённый командный пункт") is a hardened, redundant site intended to ensure command continuity under crisis or attack. The existence of a ZKP for a branch-level C2 node is consistent with Russian command-resilience doctrine. Precise locations, construction characteristics, and occupancy details for the HQ and ZKP of v/ch 93810 are not publicly disclosed.
Russian protected command posts are designed for survivability and continuity of governance. Typical characteristics include hardened structures (reinforced concrete, blast-resistant access control), independent life support (redundant power generation, protected communications nodes, independent ventilation/filtration), electromagnetic shielding, and multiple communication paths (fiber, radio, and military/civil ATC interfaces). Such characteristics are widely described in Russian doctrinal and engineering literature for ZKPs. There is no publicly available technical dossier confirming the specific configuration at v/ch 93810.
A VTA command-and-control center’s communications posture normally encompasses integration with military command networks and the national Unified Air Traffic Management System (ЕС ОрВД) for aeronautical information exchange, flight plan processing, and ATC coordination. Capabilities typically span HF/VHF/UHF aeronautical communications, secure landline/fiber networks, and military data channels enabling real-time mission tracking and tasking. While this describes standard Russian C2 practice, the exact equipment suites, vendors, and network topologies employed by v/ch 93810 are not publicly documented.
Facilities associated with a service-level C2 center usually include an operations hall for situational display and mission control; briefing and planning rooms; communications and server rooms with environmental controls; secure storage and document handling; and redundant power and UPS systems. When a protected command post exists, it is commonly separated from the main HQ and built to higher survivability standards. There are no official public sources that detail the building count, floor area, or internal layout for the HQ or ZKP associated with v/ch 93810.
Military Transport Aviation provides strategic and operational airlift for the Russian Armed Forces, including support to exercises, mobilization activities, humanitarian missions, and combat operations. Since 2015, publicly visible VTA activity has included sustained airlift supporting operations in Syria and large-scale logistical movements in connection with Russia’s war against Ukraine beginning in 2022. While a branch-level C2 center would centrally coordinate such movements at the institutional level, open sources do not attribute specific mission commands or operational decisions directly to v/ch 93810.
Aircraft types routinely associated with Russian Military Transport Aviation include the Il-76 family (Il-76MD/MD-M and Il-76MD-90A), An-124-100 Ruslan, An-12, and An-26/An-26-100. The An-22 "Antey" fleet has seen sharply reduced activity and is largely withdrawn from regular service. These aircraft operate from multiple VTA hubs across Russia. As a command-and-control entity, the 677th center does not itself operate aircraft; it plans, tasks, and monitors sorties flown by subordinate aviation regiments and divisions. Public sources do not enumerate specific units subordinated to v/ch 93810.
The Russian Ministry of Defense does not publish the location of the 677th Military Transport Aviation Command and Control Center (v/ch 93810), its headquarters, or its protected command post. Open-source mentions of v/ch numbers often appear in legal, employment, or procurement contexts without precise geolocation. No authoritative, verifiable geospatial coordinates for the HQ or ZKP associated with v/ch 93810 are available in official public records. As such, this report does not include an asserted location.
Russian command-and-control installations apply layered security consistent with MoD regulations: controlled perimeters, entry checkpoints, identification and access control, security patrols, and technical surveillance countermeasures in sensitive spaces. Protected command posts incorporate additional physical and technical security. Detailed guard-force composition, sensor layouts, and access procedures for v/ch 93810 are not publicly released.
Branch-level VTA command-and-control centers coordinate with multiple stakeholders: subordinate transport aviation divisions and regiments; the VKS Main Command; the National Defense Management Center for strategic reporting; other services (e.g., Airborne Troops for airdrop operations); and the civil State ATM Corporation for integration with national air traffic management. The specific interface control documents, data exchange formats, and duty rosters for v/ch 93810 are not publicly available.
Generic indicators of a Russian fixed command-and-control site include: secured compound layouts with administrative blocks and a central operations building; antenna fields (HF/VHF/UHF) and fiber entry points; generator plants and fuel storage for backup power; hardened or partially bermed structures consistent with protected facilities; and restricted, unmarked facilities with limited public-facing signage. For a ZKP, look for hardened access portals, ventilation structures, and redundant communications nodes separated from the main HQ. No open-source imagery confirmed to be of v/ch 93810’s HQ or ZKP is cited here.
Many details pertinent to the 677th Military Transport Aviation Command and Control Center (v/ch 93810)—including locations, internal organization, staffing, communications suites, and protected command post specifications—are not publicly disclosed and are likely classified. Where this report discusses capabilities and infrastructure, it relies on doctrinal norms and widely reported characteristics of Russian command-and-control practice rather than unit-specific disclosures. Confidence in the unit’s identification and general role is moderate based on open-source mentions; confidence in site-specific details is low due to the absence of authoritative public data.