Designation: 590th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (Russian: 590-й зенитный ракетный полк). Military unit (в/ч) number: 31665. Service: Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), Air and Missile Defence Troops. Primary system: S-400 Triumf (NATO: SA-21 Growler).
The regiment’s mission is area air and missile defense of critical facilities and regions assigned by the VKS. Tasks include detection, tracking, and engagement of aerodynamic targets (fixed-wing aircraft, UAVs, cruise missiles) and, within advertised system parameters, certain ballistic targets. The regiment integrates into regional air-defense networks to provide layered coverage with other VKS assets.
Russian S-400 regiments are subordinated to Air Defense divisions within Air and Air Defence Armies of the VKS. The specific higher headquarters for military unit 31665 has not been officially disclosed in public sources. Open-source references associate v/ch 31665 with the 590th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment; however, authoritative MoD publications do not list detailed command relationships for this unit.
The S-400 Triumf, developed by Almaz–Antey and fielded by the VKS since 2007, is a long-range SAM system. Key components include the 30K6E command-and-control architecture; 55K6E command post; 91N6E long-range acquisition radar; 92N6E engagement radar; optional 96L6E all-altitude radar; 5P85TE2/5P85SE2 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs); and 40V6-series mast options for radar elevation. The system is road-mobile and designed for rapid emplacement.
Commonly fielded interceptors include: 40N6 (advertised maximum range up to 400 km vs aerodynamic targets), 48N6DM (up to 250 km), 9M96E2 (up to ~120 km), and 9M96E (short-to-medium range). Engagement capacity (as publicly stated by Russian sources) allows simultaneous guidance of multiple missiles against numerous targets; open literature frequently cites engagement of up to 36 targets with up to 72 missiles in flight, depending on configuration. Actual performance depends on radar line-of-sight, target aspect, ECM environment, and missile load-out.
A VKS S-400 regiment typically fields two to three battalions (divisions), each with an engagement radar (92N6E), supporting surveillance radar (e.g., 96L6E as needed), and 8–12 TELs, though exact complements vary by unit and period. Standard field sites include dispersed launcher pads (usually in groups of four), radar positions (sometimes on 40V6 masts to improve horizon), a regimental/battalion command post, generator and support vehicles, and local point-defense systems (commonly Pantsir-S1) for protection against low-altitude threats.
The precise peacetime garrison/HQ location for military unit 31665 has not been officially published in open Ministry of Defence sources. Publicly accessible Russian unit registries and veteran fora identify v/ch 31665 as the 590th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, but consistent, authoritative location data for the HQ is not available in the public domain.
Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the VKS redeployed multiple S-400 units to strengthen air defense coverage over border regions (including, among others, Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, and Rostov oblasts) and occupied Crimea. Open-source reporting has indicated that elements associated with the 590th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (v/ch 31665) were among units moved closer to the Ukrainian theater. Official confirmation tying specific fielded batteries and positions to v/ch 31665 has not been published; attribution in open sources is based on indirect indicators and should be treated accordingly.
Deployed S-400 elements in western Russia and Crimea have been used to deter and engage Ukrainian fixed-wing aviation near the front, defend against cruise missiles and UAVs targeting logistics nodes and airbases, and provide area coverage for critical infrastructure. In practice, the S-400 is employed as part of a layered network with legacy S-300 variants, medium-range systems (e.g., Buk), point-defense (Pantsir-S1), and regional surveillance radars. Emissions control, frequent site rotation, dispersion of launchers, and the use of decoys have been observed across the theater to mitigate strike risk.
Field sites generally feature hardstand or graded-earth launcher pads, vehicle revetments, camouflaged radar positions, and nearby logistics and maintenance areas. Where available, radar elevation masts are used to extend low-altitude coverage; however, mast employment introduces setup time and can increase site signature. Point-defense systems are positioned to cover radar and CP vehicles. Dispersed battery footprints and the establishment of auxiliary dummy sites have been documented across multiple regions since 2022.
Several S-400 batteries and components have been publicly reported destroyed or damaged by Ukrainian strikes, particularly in Crimea. Notable cases include the destruction of an S-400 battery near Olenivka/Mizhvodne (northwestern Crimea) on 23 August 2023 and a complex strike near Yevpatoria on 14 September 2023 that damaged S-400 components, as documented by widely circulated imagery and official Ukrainian statements and acknowledged in independent reporting. Additional strikes in 2024 around Dzhankoi were reported to have damaged S-400-associated assets. These incidents do not have confirmed unit-level attribution to the 590th in public domain sources.
S-400 regiments are integrated with regional early-warning radars (e.g., Nebo-family), legacy S-300PS/PM systems, medium-range assets, and point-defense systems via VKS command-and-control frameworks. This integration allows cueing between sensors and shooters and enables deconfliction across engagement zones. The regiment’s command post interfaces with higher-echelon air-defense nodes to receive tasking and air tracks and to contribute to the recognized air picture.
S-400 deployments require sustained resupply of interceptor missiles, fuel, and generator support, along with maintenance for radars and TELs. Reload operations occur using dedicated transloaders and are time- and resource-intensive, contributing to battery vulnerability during and immediately after firing. Units typically maintain alternate positions and road-march practices to reduce predictability. Missile assortments at firing units are tailored to anticipated threats and logistics availability.
In-theater unit attribution is complicated by the Russian practice of rotating batteries, mixed detachments, and the limited visibility of unit identifiers on operational vehicles. Public attributions to v/ch 31665 (590th) in 2022–2024 rely on convoy observations, personnel insignia seen in non-official media, and local reporting; such indicators can be suggestive but are not equivalent to official confirmation. No publicly released Russian MoD documents unambiguously detail the regiment’s current positions or complete order of battle.
Gaps: precise current HQ/garrison location for v/ch 31665; current battalion count and missile load-outs; authoritative higher-command assignment; exact deployment sites and timelines since 2022. Confidence: moderate that the 590th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (v/ch 31665) is equipped with S-400 and has been involved in the western-theater air-defense posture after February 2022, based on convergent open-source reporting; low confidence for specific site attributions without official disclosure or unambiguous imagery.