The 14th Missile Division is a formation of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya, RVSN). It is associated in open sources with the garrison at or near Yoshkar-Ola in the Republic of Mari El and is commonly listed under military unit 34096 for the division headquarters. The division is subordinated to the 27th Guards Missile Army (headquartered in Vladimir). Its mission, in line with other RVSN formations, is to maintain continuous strategic nuclear deterrence through the operation of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems.
Open-source reporting attributes the following subordinate elements to the division: 1) 290th Missile Regiment, military unit 93876, equipped with RS-24 Yars (road-mobile). 2) 697th Missile Regiment, military unit 07387, equipped with RS-24 Yars (road-mobile). 3) 779th Missile Regiment, military unit 69795, equipped with RS-24 Yars (road-mobile). 4) 846th Mobile Command Post, associated with military unit 34096, providing deployable command-and-control support at division level. These identifiers appear in publicly available registries and media references; specific internal manning levels, launcher counts, and exact garrison addresses are not publicly disclosed.
The division is associated with the Yoshkar-Ola area in the Republic of Mari El, a region characterized by mixed forest, rural settlement patterns, and an extensive network of secondary roads. Such terrain is consistent with the operating doctrine of road-mobile ICBM units, which emphasize concealment, dispersion, and maneuver along pre-surveyed routes and prepared field positions. The climate and vegetation enable seasonal camouflage and maskirovka measures, while hardstand areas and engineered routes in the garrison zone support rapid exit to patrol areas.
The 290th, 697th, and 779th Missile Regiments are reported with the RS-24 Yars (Russian designation RS-24; commonly referenced as 15Zh55; U.S./NATO designation often reported as SS-27 Mod 2, with some sources using SS-29). The system is a solid-propellant, three-stage ICBM available in both silo and road-mobile configurations; the division’s regiments are associated with the road-mobile variant on the MZKT-79221 16x16 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). RS-24 Yars is MIRV-capable and has an intercontinental range generally assessed in open literature at approximately 11,000 km. It employs cold-launch techniques from a sealed transport-launch canister and is designed with countermeasure suites to complicate missile defense.
As with other mobile RVSN formations, the division’s permanent deployment area includes secure vehicle shelters/garages for TELs and support vehicles, technical facilities for missile preparation and maintenance, communications nodes, training ranges for convoy and field drills, and logistics support (fuel, spares, and life-support services). Mobile operations rely on pre-surveyed launch areas, engineered hardstands, and concealed parking sites along patrol routes. Sensitive warhead storage, handling, and technical servicing are subject to strict controls and specialized procedures; detailed layouts and storage arrangements are not public.
The division is integrated into the RVSN strategic command-and-control framework, which employs hardened, redundant communications (including wired, radio, and satellite channels) and integrates with national-level nuclear command systems reported in public sources under the umbrella of the Kazbek architecture. The 846th Mobile Command Post (military unit 34096) enables the division to deploy mobile and alternate command posts during field operations, maintaining connectivity to higher echelons and subordinated regiments, and ensuring continuity of control under dispersed conditions. Specific equipment suites, frequencies, and deployment patterns are not publicly released.
Public reporting from the Russian Ministry of Defense and regional media periodically notes field deployments, patrols, and readiness drills by the Yoshkar-Ola missile formation using Yars PGRK (road-mobile missile system). Typical activities include rapid exit from garrison, movement along designated patrol routes, occupation of field launch areas, and conducting training events for launch preparation, communication checks, and CBRN protection measures. Units rehearse recovery to base, counter-sabotage procedures, and sustainment operations in austere conditions. The frequency, duration, and exact routes of such activities are not disclosed in detail.
Mobile ICBM operations are supported by layered force protection that includes installation security at permanent deployment areas and convoy security during movements. Public sources describe the use of engineer reconnaissance for route clearance, camouflage and deception, counter-sabotage patrols, and anti-UAV observation. RVSN units employ specialized security elements and equipment to detect and deter reconnaissance and sabotage; however, specific force compositions, patrol schedules, and sensor/weapon system details for this division are not publicly available.
RS-24 Yars launchers and missiles fell under the accountability provisions of the New START Treaty while bilateral implementation was active. Russia announced a suspension of participation in New START in February 2023; data exchanges and inspections have not been conducted since. Prior to suspension, mobile ICBM launchers such as those operated by this division were counted for treaty purposes. Post-suspension, no verified public accounting is available for the division’s deployed launchers or warheads, and unit-level holdings are not disclosed.
Open-source histories indicate the 14th Missile Division previously operated RT-2PM Topol (SS-25) systems and underwent rearmament to RS-24 Yars as part of broader RVSN modernization in the 2010s. The transition to Yars has been documented across multiple RVSN formations, beginning with initial Yars deployment in 2010 and continuing in subsequent years. Publicly released imagery and statements have associated the Yoshkar-Ola formation with Yars patrols and training activities through the 2020s. Precise rearmament timelines and regimental conversion sequences at the unit level are not officially detailed in the public domain.
Exact coordinates of garrisons and field launch areas, numbers of launchers per regiment, warhead loadings, alert postures, and internal readiness procedures are not publicly released and are assessed as sensitive or classified. The military unit numbers cited (34096, 93876, 07387, 69795) and the association of the three regiments with RS-24 Yars are reflected in open sources; however, authoritative confirmation of detailed orders of battle, equipment counts, and daily operations is not available in the public domain. All assessments above are limited to verifiable, publicly reported information.